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As international engagement in the Afghanistan conflict winds down, SOF and 
CT specialists are paying closer attention to irregular conflict and extremist 
activity in the rest of the world. The sad news is, of course, that there is much to 
pay attention to. 
A multifaceted extremist insurgency has affected much of the southern Philip-
pine archipelago for several decades now. To help the Philippine armed forces 
deal with these terrorist groups, the US Special Operations Command conducts 
a number of routine Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events in the 
Philippines every year. Because of a lack of rigorous planning, execution, and 
assessment, writes Major Emmanuel G. Cabahug of the Philippine Army, these 
trainings are failing to live up to their potential, and an opportunity is being 
wasted. Fortunately, he concludes, these problems could be fairly easily cor-
rected with a change in focus and the implementation of a plan for evaluation, 
assessment, and incorporation of lessons learned. The separatist insurgency 
that Turkey faces is also decades old. Turkish Army First Lieutenant Mehmet 
Kanmaz describes the many ways in which the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 
a group that uses terrorist tactics against the Turkish state, ensures its financial 
survival. Like a criminal syndicate, the PKK relies on drug and human smuggling, 
extortion, money laundering, and other illegal and quasi-legal activities to keep 
the money flowing and stay in business. Kanmaz suggests a number of steps 
Turkey should take to improve its counterterrorism operations and cut off the 
PKK’s money supply if the state is going to prevail.
From the Golden Crescent, we move to central Africa, where Ugandan Army 
Major David Munyua delves into the command structure of one of the most 
notoriously vicious terrorist groups in the world, the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA). Since its beginnings as a militant political splinter group in the late 1980s, 
the LRA has devolved into a chronic insurgency that emerges from its hideouts in 
the forests and mountains of central Africa to kidnap, kill, and mutilate. Munyua 
considers who the next generation of LRA leaders will be, as its first generation 
commanders die, defect, or are pushed out of power, and what vulnerabilities 
these new leaders might exhibit. 
Looking to the future from a somewhat different angle, Lieutenant Colonel Fa-
bian Sandor of the Hungarian Army believes that most militaries are still living 
in the past and have not yet grasped the looming significance of hybrid warfare. 
In his brief essay on the development of NATO SOF, Sandor cautions against 
relying on—and paying for—legacy systems and legacy thinking to counter 
opponents’ asymmetric and irregular strategies and tactics. 
For the final feature article in this issue, we bring you a report about the first of 
what is planned to be an annual symposium hosted by the Special Operations 
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Research Association (SORA). SORA is a think tank based in the United States, devoted to research on special operations 
and related topics. The symposium, which took place on 24–25 October 2014 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, brought 
together more than 100 experts, military specialists, and other interested participants to hear presentations and discuss 
aspects of “Special Operations and Strategic Implications.” 
For our CTAP interview, Dr. Doug Borer of the US Naval Postgraduate School spoke with Dr. Michael Noonan of the 
Foreign Policy Research Institute about Noonan’s experiences as a member of a military transition team in Iraq. Deployed 
in 2006 to the district of Tal Afar, Noonan’s team was assigned to help an Iraqi battalion improve its staff operations and 
take control of the district’s security. Noonan speaks vividly about this difficult period of the Iraq War, when, he suggests, 
the seeds of the current fight for control of Iraq and Syria were sown. 
George Lober, in his Ethics and Insights column, delves into the difficult questions of personal morality that are particular 
to fighters in times of conflict. In the first article of a two-part series titled “Making Decisions, Taking Ethical Respon-
sibility,” Lober uses the examples of Jewish refugees in 1938 and Rwandan Tutsis in 1994, and concentrates on the very 
different decisions of two men, one a Swiss state police officer and the other a Belgian Army captain, when faced with a 
barrage of desperate people fleeing certain death.
We have two book reviews on offer this time. Major David Munyua discusses Idean Salehyan’s book Rebels without Bor-
ders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics (Cornell University Press, 2009), which, as the title suggests, deals with 
the phenomenon of what Salehyan calls “transnational rebellion” (TNR) and its link to civil conflict. While praising the 
book as a welcome discussion of the TNR phenomenon and ways to counteract it, Munyua notes that some of the gener-
alities Salehyan derives may require closer study. The second review, by Colonel Ian Rice, US Army, examines journalist 
Malcolm Gladwell’s newest work, David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants (Little, Brown 
and Co., 2013). Rice lauds Gladwell’s ability to deconstruct difficult concepts related to personal or cultural prejudices and 
recommends the book for anyone who wants to deepen their understanding of the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.
As always, JSOU has a couple of new studies on offer in our Publications section. We urge you to write a letter to the editor 
(CTXeditor@globalecco.org) and let us know what you think about what you’ve read in CTX, or anything else in the CT 
world that’s on your mind. You can also keep up on global CT news and comment on articles by “liking” Global ECCO on 
Facebook. If you are interested in submitting an article for possible publication, see our submission guidelines at https://
globalecco.org/ctx-submissions.
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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SOF Joint Combined Exchange Training  
from a Host Nation’s Perspective
MAJ Emmanuel G. Cabahug,  
Philippine Army
“Victory in war starts in training” is an aphorism that rings 
true for every military, and even nonmilitary, organization.1 Routine training 
events, in the form of SOF Joint Combined Exchange Trainings (JCETs), have 
taken place in the Philippines for more than two decades as part of the resolute 
US response to global terrorism.2 Among other goals, the primary intent of the 
Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) JCET is to provide Philippine 
security forces with the ability and competencies to thwart terrorist acts and to 
deny terrorists both sanctuary and training grounds for their activities in the 
Southeast Pacific region. After many millions of US dollars have been spent, 
however, has this program been effective? 
In this essay, I explore how JCETs have affected the host nation’s operational and 
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these trainings are thoroughly planned and programmed, conducted to a high 
standard, jointly assessed, and continually evaluated, they are not likely to result 
in the optimal training outcome. The term optimal is defined here as a function 
of the unit’s performance (both individual and collective) during training and 
actual combat deployment. In other words, has the training improved the par-
ticipants’ knowledge and skills so that they are able to apply their newly 
acquired skills toward greater mission success?
Overview of JCETs in the Philippines
Every year, the armed forces of the Philippines host ap-
proximately seven to ten JCETs with SOCPAC: three to four 
with the Philippine Army (PA); two to three with the Philip-
pine Navy/Marines; and two to three with the Philippine 
Air Force. Each of these JCETs is service-centric and caters to 
the training needs of the Philippine security forces. The most 
serious obstacles to Philippine and US interoperability include 
constraints on doctrine and organization; differing tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs); incompatible communica-
tions equipment; a lack of well-established training facilities and 
adequate equipment in the Philippines; and insufficient funding 
from the Philippine government. Most of the PA JCET training 
activities are conducted directly in the field with units of 70 PA SOF 
personnel, on average. 
More often than not, however, the JCET fails to include personnel 
from the various Philippine schoolhouses (the Special Forces 
School, Scout Ranger Training School, and Counter-Terrorist 
Training and Development School). If their personnel were 
able to participate, these schools could then integrate the best 
practices, TTPs, and lessons learned that were acquired during 
JCETs and similar bilateral training exercises into their programs 
of instruction. As it is, the acquired skill sets benefit only the 
unit and the individual soldiers who participate in a given 
JCET. The subsequent transfer of institutional knowledge and 
expertise is typically neglected because the JCET participants 
quickly become preoccupied with current operational re-
quirements on the frontlines. This problem is exacerbated by 
the lack of resources to sustain the training and readiness 
of personnel on the frontlines. This is clearly a less-than-
optimal arrangement, so why does it continue?
The JCET Process: Programming, Coordination, Planning, 
Execution, and Evaluation and Assessment
Ideally, each JCET is programmed and incorporated into the yearly list of 
bilateral training activities of the Philippines-United States Mutual Defense 
Board (MDB)-Security Engagement Board (SEB).4 The MDB, which was created 
to oversee the implementation of the bilateral 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, 
addresses the traditional security concerns of both parties. The SEB was created 
in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks primarily, but not exclusively, to deal 
with the nontraditional issues of counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, 
May 2015
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and disaster relief operations. The MDB-SEB meets twice a year (alternating between the Philippine capital, Manila, and 
Honolulu in the US state of Hawaii) to discuss and finalize the approximately 350 to 400 activities proposed for the 
succeeding year. The combined board is also supposed to assess all of the bilateral activities of the current year in order 
to sustain those programs that provide optimal outcomes and to enhance or refocus the ones that are not delivering 
the intended effects or benefits. Once the exercise plans are approved by their respective signatories (Commander, 
US Pacific Command, and Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines), both countries’ points of contact (which 
include the SOCPAC Operations Directorate, the in-country security cooperation representative [ Joint United States 
Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines], and the Philippine armed forces’ executive agent) need 
to coordinate the dates for the predeployment site survey (PDSS) and 
initial planning conference (IPC) for a specific JCET.
Active monitoring and coordination among the two countries’ 
points of contact are crucial to the success of the JCET, considering 
the timelines and other administrative requirements of both 
countries’ participating units. The PDSS and IPC, which last from 
five to seven days, are conducted to survey suitable training sites 
and facilities, determine the logistical requirements of the exercise, 
determine the training events and timelines, and address other details 
for the JCET. Training normally takes place about six months after 
the PDSS and IPC are completed in order to ensure all the preliminary 
requirements have been met. A significant factor in the success of 
the exercise is how well prepared the host nation is in terms of its 
proposed training concept and the resources needed to realize the 
concept. Such preparations are therefore scrutinized during the PDSS 
and IPC. If the host nation planners have an extensive, well-developed 
training concept, it is easier for the US planners to refine the concept 
based on the skills and competencies of the designated US SOF team, 
and to anticipate the resources required for the specific JCET. The 
planners on both sides are expected to jointly draft the administra-
tive procedures agreement, which lays out all the administrative and 
logistical arrangements that both parties will execute in order to 
ensure the successful conduct of the exercise. The IPC also produces a 
draft exercise plan and training calendar. 
Because US law requires that more than 50% of the training benefits 
the US participants, US SOF personnel usually have the opportunity to 
undergo special training in jungle survival and stick and knife fighting. 
As time and budgets allow, US participants who are training on Luzon 
Island may also visit military and historical landmarks such as the 
Camp Pangatian Memorial Shrine (site of the Cabanatuan Raid), the 
Capas National Shrine (memorializing the Bataan Death March), and 
Corregidor Island.
The IPC includes a final planning conference and final site survey 
lasting three to five days, during which time the actual training dates are 
chosen, the administrative procedures agreement is confirmed, and the 
exercise plan and training calendar are refined. There are plenty of “nuts 
and bolts” details that must be dealt with, all the way from preparation 
to mission completion, and regular communication between all the 
concerned parties is vital for the process to work. 
Often, legal pressure from anti-US organizations in the Philippines poses 
a serious challenge to the execution of the JCET. Because PA SOF units 
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that are projected to participate in the JCET are regularly involved in real-world 
operations, they have become the primary targets for legal harassment by 
organizations that want to discredit all military operations.5 These organizations 
make their voices heard by routinely filing complaints, particularly on human 
rights matters, and appealing to leftist-oriented media outlets. Lawyers for these 
organizations know that by pursuing these actions, they will be able to impede 
the professional training and development of PA soldiers. This legal strategy re-
lies heavily on the US Leahy amendment, which dictates that all foreign national 
SOF units and their respective training participants and unit commanders need 
to be approved by the US government for each JCET.6 There have been instances 
in which the number of PA personnel expected to participate in the JCET was 
trimmed by almost half (e.g., from 70 personnel down to 40) due to these legal 
challenges. Moreover, the Philippine Scout Rangers, a critical combat unit, were 
denied permission to participate in JCETs from 2010 to 2012 because of standing 
legal complaints filed by these opposition groups. As a consequence, the Scout 
Rangers’ training and operational readiness have been put at risk. 
Last but not least, the MDB-SEB has largely failed 
to follow up with a serious evaluation and assess-
ment of its bilateral military activities, including 
the JCETs. The absence of any candid assessments 
limits the ability of the JCET program to obtain 
its optimal outcome of improved interoperability. 
Therefore, some issues and concerns that have 
arisen during previous JCET exercises are reoccur-
ring because they have not been taken into serious 
consideration and targeted for corrective action by 
the joint committees. An example of this recurring 
capability gap is the interoperability of the Philip-
pines’ armed services (Army, Navy/Marines, and 
Air Force) in the conduct of joint and combined 
arms training and operation. Close collaboration 
and synchronized efforts among Philippine security 
forces on the ground, in the air, and at sea are crucial 
elements that contribute to successful combat opera-
tions. The development of a combined PA-US evalu-
ation and assessment report would be an essential 
tool to ensure continuity between previous JCETs 
and current and future JCETs. It is vital that both 
sides know where they left off in previous JCETs so 
they can build on the lessons learned and address the 
capability gaps. Unfortunately, the existing process 
is all too reminiscent of the movie Groundhog Day, 
in which the same difficulties happen over and over 
again without anyone seeming to understand why.7
The Defining Factors of JCET:  
A Personal Reflection
From the second half of 2009 to the first half of 
2014, I facilitated the conduct of the Army SOF 
JCETs and observed other sister-service (Navy/
May 2015
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Marines and Air Force) JCETs as well. In doing so, I noted not only the strengths 
of these exercises, but also the weaknesses and capability gaps that need atten-
tion. I consider three elements to be key if we are to optimize the conduct of 
JCETs in the Philippines: commitment, continuity, and resources.
Commitment for JCET
A JCET must not be perceived merely as “business as 
usual” for the US and Philippine participants, 
but rather as an opportunity to interact, learn, 
and share the knowledge and expertise necessary 
to have a meaningful bilateral exercise. It must 
add a solid connective thread to strengthen the 
already existing cord of friendly relations between 
the two countries, even as it reinforces the host na-
tion’s capacity and capability to address domestic and 
external challenges. From top to bottom, participants, 
commanders, planners, and decision makers must pos-
sess a firm commitment that includes a positive attitude, 
a willingness to acknowledge problems, and the ability 
to set serious goals for each bilateral training engagement. 
Senior commanders and decision makers on both sides 
should continually support these JCETs by articulating 
realistic goals that will address the capability gaps. This is 
especially important for the skill sets that the armed forces 
need to develop, improve, and sustain if they are to deliver 
effective blows against the enemies of the state and, ultimately, 
win and keep the people’s trust.
Training participants must always bear in mind 
that their actions are not only reflective of 
themselves and their armed forces, but also of the 
flags that they carry proudly on their shoulders. 
We (American and Philippine military personnel) 
can never avoid the scrutinizing gaze of the public, 
especially of those who are against the government. Any 
infringement of Philippine domestic laws by visiting US 
military personnel may imperil the already existing defense 
agreements of both countries and our bilateral ties as well. 
Although there have been some serious violations of domestic 
laws during exercises in the past, US SOF were not involved in those 
cases. Moreover, from a cultural perspective, Filipino soldiers usually 
respect US SOF as experts in their fields; therefore, any misconduct or 
perceived disrespect on the US side would have a tremendous negative 
impact on training outcomes. Every SOF operator must be sensitive to the 
host nation’s culture and, in turn, should not assume that Filipinos have a 
good grasp of the visiting forces’ culture.
Continuity of JCET
JCET program continuity is vital to the strategic goal of enhancing bilateral 
ties between the United States and the Philippines, builds Philippine security 
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capabilities, and supports US security interests in the 
region. The JCET program should be integrated into 
long-term planning in a manner that supports the strategic 
intent of both countries. Too often, however, this has not 
been the case. The 2009 JCET, for instance, seemed to have 
minimal connections to the JCETs of the previous and 
succeeding years. The program should have a purposive 
engagement plan that lays out how it will help build and 
sustain the capability requirements of the Philippine 
security forces over time. One example is the Philippine-
US exercise called “Balance Pistons,” which is conducted, 
on average, three times a year. The Balance Pistons training 
events tend to be similar to each other, with the main 
difference being the training audience/unit. The official 
objective of these exercises is to “enhance the war fighting 
capacity and capability of both forces.” Simply stated, 
that objective is too broad, making it difficult to set useful 
performance measures or measures of effectiveness. In 
addition to being based on subjective inputs, the evalua-
tion and assessment portions of Balance Pistons have been 
poorly performed, with greater emphasis on quantity— 
the number of programmed activities—than on 
quality—the actual conduct of the training. These 
lapses might also be attributed to the absence of a 
cohesive and purposeful engagement plan from the 
Philippine side. 
This need for continuity is the main reason why the PA SOF 
(a regular customer of the JCETs) has developed and initi-
ated the Five-Year SOF Engagement Plan as a subset of the 
SOF Bilateral Training Roadmap. Among other objectives, 
the Training Roadmap will serve as a guide to connect each 
and every JCET conducted in the Philippines. It will delib-
erately involve the PA schoolhouses and key stakeholders 
in order to integrate the new TTPs and learning into all PA 
SOF domestic training, as well as into subsequent bilateral 
and multilateral training engagements. The intent is to 
institutionalize the TTPs and best practices acquired from 
the JCETs that can be readily applied on the battlefield. 
SOF Interoperability Training Exercise
The international SOF community must be persistent, de-
liberate, and forward-looking if it plans to develop regional 
coalition engagements, such as SOF CT/COIN–focused 
exercises with teams from partner nations like the Philip-
pines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Other 
potential participants include Australia, New Zealand, and 
other interested allied countries. Such an exercise could 
fall under the rubric of an UPSMAINT (Uninterrupted, 
Persistent, Sustaining Move Against Insurgents, Narcotics, 
and Terrorism) SOF interoperability training exercise, 
which would focus on the exchange of TTPs, best practices, 
and lessons learned to counter the latest trends and tactics 
used by terrorists, drug traffickers, and insurgents. This 
could take the form of a weeklong exercise during which 
each country shares its best practices and lessons learned 
regarding a domestic crisis or international event that 
affected that particular country. 
This proposal may sound ambitious, but it could be done 
if the participants’ commitment were genuine. If concerned 
countries are genuinely committed to concerted efforts to 
face nontraditional security threats such as terrorism, they 
should not hesitate to participate in this kind of bilateral 
or multilateral SOF interoperability exercise. In 
return for their investment of time and 
resources, participants could expect 
to achieve maximum benefit 





as an agenda 
item for 
consideration at 
SOCPAC’s annual Pacific Area 
Special Opera- tions Conference 
(PASOC), held in Hawaii and attended by 
SOF community leaders and decision makers in the 
Pacific theater. The SOF interoperability training exercise 
could serve as a practical application of SOCPAC’s initiative. 
Adopting these suggestions would go a long way toward 
eliminating the continuity lapses that I have witnessed 
during my five years as an SOF JCET insider. 
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Resources are the most crucial determinant in the interoperability game. For 
the purposes of this article, my definition of resources is confined to the military 
scope that includes training facilities, equipment, and money to support the 
JCET. Every cent spent for the JCET counts. To avoid waste, the quantity or 
frequency of bilateral engagements could be trimmed down, and a greater 
focus could be placed on the quality of the training. As both 
partners continue to experience financial constraints, they 
need to sustain the bilateral training programs that provide 
operational benefits and eradicate those programs that 
do not add sufficient value. The MDB-SEB must conduct 
thorough evaluations and assessments of all JCET activi-
ties to optimize the chances for a positive outcome. 
The quality and measurable outcomes of bilateral 
activities should be the primary concerns, not the 
quantity of the activities. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations
SOF JCETs are an excellent opportunity 
for Philippine security forces to interact 
with US SOF, share knowledge and 
best practices, and exchange TTPs 
and lessons learned in warfighting 
and nontraditional operations. 
The interoperability portion of 
the training, however, has been 
neglected. That is why, since 
2012, the PA side has proposed that a 
Philippine-US interservice JCET (called “Joint 
Piston”) should include the objective of SOF joint 
and combined arms planning and execution. Unfortunately, 
this concept has not materialized. I am not convinced that claims of 
a lack of funding for JCETs on both sides is the real issue; rather, I suspect 
that a firmer commitment by both parties and their SOF stakeholders is neces-
sary. There are other activities listed in the MDB-SEB that were not carried out 
due to lack of commitment and perseverance on the part of the event coordina-
tors. The armed forces of the Philippines, and perhaps US forces as well, are still 
blinded by their service-centric lenses. The Philippine security forces need to 
enhance their skills and competencies, specifically in the area of joint and com-
bined arms operations, in order to effectively neutralize enemies of the state. US 
SOF assistance with this concern would be extremely valuable. Perhaps one way 
of addressing this joint-combined gap is to reduce the iterations of other JCET 
programs (e.g., Balance Piston) from three per year to two, and funnel these 
funds to support a future Philippine-US Exercise Joint Piston 01-2016, that 
would include all Philippine and US SOF. Philippine National Police SOF units 
should also be invited to participate in order to add more complexity and 
fluidity to the concept of a joint, interagency, and law enforcement training 
exercise. 
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In sharing these thoughts, I anticipate a positive future for Philippines SOF 
international relations as the Philippines continues to adapt to the changing 
security landscape in the region and confronts the domestic difficulties brought 
about by terrorists, insurgents, and other criminal elements operating in the 
Philippines. Although some may perceive JCET programs as generating only 
a small benefit, in my experience, JCETs make a genuine difference in regional 
security and stability. Sometimes called the “sick man” of Asia, the Philippines 
is determined to stand up against the various internal and external challenges 
facing it. With continued US government support and assistance, particularly 
from SOCPAC, the Philippines security forces will be better able to protect the 
people against traditional and nontraditional security threats, secure the nation’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and earn a well-respected image as a strong 
US partner in the Pacific region. Finally, it takes a firm commitment, persistent 
training engagements, and the wise use of resources to ensure optimal outcomes 
and the successful attainment of SOF JCET objectives. v
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Turkey’s Fight to Shut Off the Flow  
of PKK Finances
LT Mehmet Asım Kanmaz,  
Turkish Armed Forces
A terrorist organization, like any other organization, must 
struggle to secure adequate financial resources if it is to survive and continue 
its primary activity: carrying out acts of violence. As terrorism finance expert 
Michael Freeman notes, if terrorist groups do not have enough money, their 
violence will have to come to an end.1 Martha Crenshaw, a noted scholar of 
terrorism studies, points out that the ability to act is vital for terrorist groups’ 
survival: “Acts of terrorism may be motivated by the imperative of organiza-
tional survival. … Survival is the minimal goal of any organization.” 2 To achieve 
this minimal goal, terrorists therefore must have an organizational structure that 
supports financial stability. Sustaining a terrorist organization over the long term 
is more difficult than founding one, because an existing terrorist group has to 
meet the needs of its members, such as shelter, food, clothing, and medication, 
as well as provide the materiel and weaponry required for operations.3 For this 
reason, terrorist organizations need to find lucrative, reliable, and consistent 
resources to continue their activities. 
Freeman suggests a typology that divides the sources of terrorist group financing 
into four categories: state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, and 
popular support.4 The usefulness of each type of resource varies from one group 
to another. A country’s efforts to interdict terrorist financing are an essential 
part of its overall counterterrorism strategy because successful interdiction 
will prevent terrorist groups from sustaining their activities or possibly even 
surviving. Additionally, successful countermeasures against terrorist financing 
would support other political and military countermeasures. Because terrorist 
groups take advantage of a variety of funding streams—drug trafficking, human 
smuggling, extortion, legal businesses, popular support, and state sponsorship—
it can be difficult to get at the core of their finances. Furthermore, every terrorist 
organization has its own favorite funding source. To produce effective results, 
countermeasures therefore must address each terrorist organization separately 
and focus on each group’s particular financing sources, especially the most lucra-
tive and prevalent ones. 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistani–PKK) is one of the 
most notorious terrorist groups to emerge in the late twentieth century.5 Since 
the PKK began operating in Turkey in the early 1980s, it has been a significant 
threat to Turkey’s national integrity and security. To sustain its activities, the PKK 
has benefited from all four of the aforementioned types of finance, including 
state sponsorship by the Soviet Union. When such support decreased due to the 
collapse of the USSR in 1990, the PKK adapted by shifting to illegal activities to 
compensate for the financial loss.  
The PKK would be considerably weakened if Turkey were able to interrupt the 
group’s diverse, lucrative sources of revenue. Turkey is a regional power and im-
portant trade partner in the Middle East and Europe. By utilizing international 
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cooperation and insight from its past experiences, Turkey could minimize or 
even terminate the PKK’s financial activities by taking effective countermeasures. 
This article first examines the PKK’s financial resources according to Freeman’s 
typology, and then focuses on Turkey’s possible countermeasures against the 
PKK’s funding streams. 
State Sponsorship
Due to the covert nature of state sponsorship, it is hard to obtain precise num-
bers on the states that support terrorist groups.6 According to Mitchel P. Roth 
and Murat Sever, the PKK enjoyed a great deal of state sponsorship until the early 
2000s.7 Although some of Turkey’s neighbors, such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, have 
been the PKK’s main supporters by providing safe haven, funding, and weapons 
to the terrorist organization, the PKK has had sponsors throughout the world, 
including, at various times, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Bulgaria, Libya, Greece, 
Cyprus, and Armenia.8 Ninety percent of the PKK’s financial aid came from 
three countries: the USSR (and later the Russian Federation), Greece, and Syria. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the few remaining communist countries 
generally stopped supporting terrorist groups, while other state sponsors, such 
as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, decreased their support for terrorist organizations due 
to Turkey’s increasing power and trade volume in the region.9 The PKK leader-
ship therefore realized that the group could not rely solely on state sponsors to 
survive; it had to find independent and consistent financial resources.10 
Furthermore, even though state sponsorship has always been an easy and 
lucrative source of funds for terrorist groups like the PKK, there was always the 
possibility that a state sponsor would coerce the beneficiary groups to act within 
the state’s interests. Terrorism expert Faruk Ekmekci cogently explains this 
view: “It seems that for many states terror is nothing but war by other means. 
… Terrorist organizations have provided many states a less costly alternative to 
direct confrontation with the enemy in both economic and political terms.” 11 
By using terrorist groups to do their bidding, in other words, some states have 
been able achieve their interests at a fraction of the cost of a conventional war. In 
recent years, terrorists have sought different funding sources to replace the state 
sponsorship they lost with the end of the Cold War. 
Although the PKK suffered deeply from the decrease in communist state 
sponsorship, it was luckier than other terrorist organizations because several 
countries, including Syria, Iran, and Iraq, continued to support it.12 Researchers 
Gokhan Bacik and Bezen Balamir Coskun observe, “In terms of enjoying inter-
national opportunities, the PKK should be cited as an exceptional case that has 
been tolerated almost as a legal entity.” 13 Adding to this, Özdemir and Pekgözlü 
contend that the PKK would not have been able to survive for over 30 years if it 
had not had continuous foreign support, even if such support has decreased in 
recent years.14 
Iraq, for instance, has provided the terrorist group with safe haven within its 
borders since the group’s inception, as a means to weaken Turkey.15 The PKK 
benefited from the turmoil caused by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq by increasing 
its safe havens and acquiring new camps in the northern part of the country, 
specifically in the Qandil Mountains. Iran also provided safe haven to the PKK, 
and Iranian officials let PKK terrorists travel freely within Iran’s borders. In return 








US military sites in the region.16 Similarly, Greece helped the PKK by providing 
logistical support and training for the group’s members and attempted to spirit 
PKK founder and leader Abdullah Öcalan to asylum in 1999. Carrying a Greek-
Cypriot passport, Öcalan was captured by Turkish agents at the airport in 
Nairobi, Kenya.17 Syria was another leading state sponsor of the PKK until 1998, 
when Ankara and Damascus signed the Adana Agreement, which explicitly for-
bade Syria from aiding the PKK. The PKK’s one critical training camp, known as 
the Mahsum Korkmaz Academy, was located in the Bekaa Valley on the border 
of Syria and Lebanon. Until the 1998 accord was signed, PKK leader Öcalan had 
lived and traveled in Syria without any restriction. In a 1991 interview, Öcalan 
stated that of these three, the biggest supporter of the PKK was Syria, which 
was very hospitable to the terrorist organization. He also suggested that many 
European countries were just as hospitable as Syria.18 
Syria’s support for the PKK evolved out of its several disputes with Turkey sur-
rounding water resources, territorial claims, and regional politics. “Two major 
elements of the enmity between Syria and Turkey have been Syrian irredentist 
claims over Alexandretta (Hatay), which joined Turkey in 1939, and disputes 
over sharing the waters of the Euphrates River, in which Turkey is the upstream 
country.” 19 In addition to these disputes, a third problem was Turkey’s improving 
relations with Israel, which was (and is) regarded as an enemy by Arab states in 
the Middle East. Other than these international disputes, Syria had little reason 
to support the PKK. Because the PKK is an ethnic terrorist organization that 
aims to build a Kurdish state in the region, and because Syria has a substantial 
Kurdish population within its borders, Syria would be expected to consider the 
existence of a Kurdish terrorist organization as a threat against its territorial and 
Guerrilla fighters of the PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party, train in their  
clandestine camp in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, 1991. This camp no longer exists.
Abdullah Öcalan, the Turkish-born 
founder of the PKK, 1991.
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demographic integrity. Aiding the PKK, which is an enemy of its enemy, however, 
apparently seemed more profitable and logical to Syria than trying to eradicate 
the group.20
Rising tension between Turkey and Syria eventually made Syria follow a more 
careful policy toward the PKK. In 1998, after Turkey had warned Syria many 
times to stop its aid to the PKK, Turkey deployed an additional 10,000 troops to 
the Syrian border. Syria was forced to step back due to the high cost of engaging 
in a war with Turkey, and the two countries signed the Adana Agreement on 20 
October 1998. After this agreement came into effect, Syria expelled PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan, closed the PKK’s training camps, and stopped its logistical 
support of the PKK.21 The loss of Syrian support and the imprisonment of 
Öcalan shortly thereafter damaged the PKK, and as a result, its terrorist activities 
declined between 1999 and 2002. 22
Turkey’s increasing military, economic, and political weight in the region dis-
suaded other neighbors from aiding the PKK as well. Iran, Iraq, and Russia, for 
example, saw that their aid to the PKK adversely affected their trade volume with 
Turkey. Ultimately, the cost of the aid became greater than its benefit to these 
countries. Moreover, the militant Kurdish group Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdis-
tanê [Party of Free Life of Kurdistan] emerged as a threat to Iran around 2004. 
Iraq and Russia began to cooperate with Turkey against the PKK, while Iran 
signed a security agreement with Turkey and declared the PKK to be a terrorist 
organization.23 Thus, the PKK’s financial resources from state sponsors decreased 
substantially yet again between 2004 and 2006. To survive, the PKK had to find 
a way to compensate for the losses and consequently has come to rely on illegal 
activities to sustain its operations and its existence.
Illegal Activities
The PKK’s geographical location is a critical factor in facilitating its involvement 
in illegal activities, for several reasons. First, the PKK is active in the southeastern 
region of Turkey where it borders Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Second, this part of 
Turkey is largely mountainous, which makes it more difficult for security forces 
to control the area. Third, the PKK’s territory is close to the Golden Crescent 
countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, which are the biggest heroin 
producers in Asia. Finally, Turkey is in the middle of the primary heroin and 
opium trafficking route, which starts in the Golden Crescent countries and ends 
in Europe.24 Therefore, engaging in illegal activities that include drug trafficking, 
smuggling, and extortion is an easy and independent way for the PKK to raise 
a substantial amount of funds. Researchers note that “the PKK’s annual income 
derived [solely] from criminal activities was estimated as 86 million US dollars 
at its peak in the 1990s.” 25 Although it is difficult to determine precise numbers 
on the PKK’s current income due to the covert nature of its activities,26 it can be 
assumed that its income has remained substantial because of these illicit revenue 
streams.
Drug Trafficking
Drug trafficking is a lucrative resource for terrorists, and the PKK has involved 
itself in every phase of the regional drug trade.27 “A kilogram of heroin can 
be bought for between $1,000 and $2,000 in Thailand or Afghanistan. As it 
moves through the drug hierarchy to market, the value rises to $6,000–$8,000 
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in Turkey, before reaching Germany where it wholesales for $20,000–$80,000, 
with a street value of $200,000.” 28 To maximize the amount of money that the 
PKK can make, it has formed an organizational structure that allows it to engage 
in more drug trafficking activities.29
In the PKK’s early drug trafficking days, its only income was the protection 
money it demanded from drug smugglers. When the PKK noticed that it could 
acquire even more money by involving itself more actively in the drug trade, it 
started producing, distributing, and transporting narcotics, primarily heroin 
and opium, from the Golden Crescent countries to Europe. To become more 
effective at this enterprise, the PKK recruited people from the Kurdish diaspora 
in Europe to distribute drugs in the streets of European cities.30 Due to the vast 
number of these recruits, the PKK is widely active in countries such as England, 
Germany, the Netherlands, and France.31 Haydar Karaman explains this change 
for the PKK: 
In most cases, these groups [like the PKK] do not engage in drugs 
during the initial stage of their combat. However, due to an increasing 
number of cadres and operations, during the enlargement stage, this 
necessity compels them to get involved in drug trafficking. Their 
success in terms of enlargement is related to the funding demands 
of the organization.32
Since state sponsorships began to drop off in the early 2000s, drug trafficking 
has become the PKK’s most profitable and popular financial resource for several 
reasons. First, it is easy to transport and hide narcotics because they can be 
divided into tiny packages.33 It is difficult for law enforcement officers in Turkey, 
both gendarmerie and police officers, to find hidden narcotics without any prior 
intelligence or notice from citizens. Since there are many methods and places to 
hide the narcotics, sometimes even trained dogs cannot find them. Second, drug 
trafficking brings in a huge amount of money in a short time because the produc-
tion of the drugs is relatively easy, and they are in high demand. Third, large-scale 
narcotics trafficking requires international links.34 This requirement is not a 
problem for the PKK because the Kurdish diaspora extends across Europe and 
helps it sell the goods. In 2001, Michael Radu estimated that there were 800,000 
Kurdish immigrants in Europe, mainly in Germany,35 and that a number of 
these people were involved in the PKK’s drug distribution network. According to 
another report, “Germany’s chief prosecutor asserted that eighty percent of the 
drugs captured in Europe have been linked to the PKK.” 36 The same report says 
that the PKK uses money acquired from the drug trade to purchase weapons.37
Human Smuggling
The geographical location of the PKK’s territory also provides opportunities 
for human smuggling. The PKK reportedly has joined a network with criminal 
groups in other countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Albania, Hungary, and Italy, which enables it to smuggle people from 
the Middle East and Asia into Europe.38 Three routes are most frequently used by 
the PKK and its partner organizations for human smuggling: Istanbul to Milan, 
Istanbul to Bosnia to Milan, and Turkey to Tunisia to Malta to Italy.39 The PKK’s 
human smuggling activities have provided three main benefits for the terrorist 
group: a considerable amount of money, new recruits in Europe, and increased 
power in the region.40 
An addict in his home after  
shooting up heroin. 
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Human smuggling has been the next most lucrative source 
of funds for the PKK after drug trafficking. Roth and Sever 
report that in the mid-1990s, the PKK demanded between 
2,000 and 3,000 euros for each person they transported to 
Europe. An Italian police report reveals that the PKK was 
connected with the smuggling of 9,000 Kurdish people 
from Anatolia to Europe in 2001. In another case in 2005, 
Romanian police uncovered a branch of the PKK’s human 
smuggling operation in Romania, along with a cache of 
fake passports and bank documents. Furthermore, the 
undocumented immigrants the police caught confirmed 
that the smugglers demanded 6,000 to 7,000 euros per 
person to go to Berlin, Vienna, Paris, or London.41 In addi-
tion to its smuggling activities, the PKK also threatens rival 
smugglers to force them to cooperate with it and demands 
that they pay a regular protection fee.42 Given the numbers 
of smuggled people and the money each one pays, the PKK 
can be assumed to be making a substantial income from its 
human smuggling network.
Another benefit of human 
smuggling activities, as mentioned 
earlier, is that they provide recruit-
ment opportunities and help the 
PKK increase its influence among 
the undocumented immigrant 
populations in Europe. According 
to reports, the PKK forcibly incor-
porates the immigrants it brings 
to Europe, including Kurdish 
children from 10 to 14 years old, 
into its drug trafficking activities. 
In one such case, an 11-year-old child who was arrested 
in Hamburg in 1993 confessed that he was smuggled 
into Germany and forced to sell drugs by the PKK. These 
children are too young to face criminal liability, which 
makes them attractive to the PKK for its illegal activities.43 
Thus, in addition to the financial gain from human smug-
gling, the PKK increases its power in Europe by recruiting 
and controlling these illegal immigrants, who are unable 
to turn to the authorities for help. Despite the PKK’s listing 
as a terrorist organization, only a few European countries 
so far have moved to prosecute it for its organized crime 
activities on the continent.
Extortion
Another popular financial resource for the PKK in Europe 
and the Middle East has been extortion, which the group 
tries to hide by calling the funds “revolutionary taxes” or 
“voluntary contributions.” Extortion can be carried out 
through kidnaping for ransom or by threatening to destroy 
people’s properties and businesses. In north London, for 
instance, many restaurants pay “insurance fees” to the local 
PKK to prevent them from damaging the restaurants, in a 
manner reminiscent of the “protection rackets” run by the 
Mafia. The PKK also extorts drug traffickers and smugglers 
by forcing them to pay so-called “taxes” on their activities. 
In addition, the PKK demands a “membership fee” from 
undocumented immigrants in European countries who 
work under a PKK front organization. Until recently, with 
the fear of arrest and deportation hanging over them, 
these victims were unwilling to complain to the authorities 
about these extortion activities.44 Since the United States 
and the European Union designated the PKK as a terrorist 
organization in 1997 and 2002 respectively, however, the 
PKK began to lose some of the leverage to extort Kurdish 
people with violence and threats as it had in the past. 
Extortion brought a great deal of money to the PKK:  
“In 1993 alone the PKK extorted 2.5 million pounds from 
Kurdish immigrants and businessmen within Great 
Britain.” 45 During Operation Sputnik, a coordinated 
police crackdown across several 
European countries which took 
place in 1996, Belgian police 
learned that the PKK was taking in 
almost 300,000 Belgian francs (a 
bit less than US$10,000) per month 
through extortion in Belgium 
alone. Similarly, in relation to the 
Belgian operation, German police 
discovered that the PKK acquired 
almost 250 million deutsche marks 
per month from its extortion ac-
tivities in Germany.46 PKK founder Öcalan claimed in 1999 
that the PKK’s annual income from its extortion activities 
in European countries was 30 million deutsche marks.47 
More recently, the German Ministry of Interior Report for 
2006 and 2007 noted that “the PKK collected 1.4 million 
Euros as protection money from Kurdish people in the 
North Rhine-Westphalia state, Germany.” 48 Although 
the group continues to collect a great deal of money from 
extortion, its income from such activity declined in recent 
years due to its terrorist designation. For this reason, it 
began to increase its legal activities in Europe, which are 
described in further detail below.
Money Laundering and Other Financial Activities
Money laundering, counterfeiting, and smuggling in all its 
various forms have brought significant income to the PKK. 
As part of Operation Sputnik, for example, Scotland Yard 
and the Belgian Police seized 350 million Belgian francs 
after they discovered that Med TV, a PKK-affiliated broad-








Even though this business shut down in 1999, the PKK founded another broad-
casting company, Medya TV, the next year.49 In addition, “banks in Belgium, 
Cyprus, Jersey [in the UK], and Switzerland provide privacy for PKK funds; 
monetary transactions are carried out through the hawala system or by cash 
couriers.” 50 Of these countries, Cyprus is especially known as the PKK’s money 
laundering center. Furthermore, in the mid-1990s, the International Criminal 
Police Organization (Interpol) uncovered the PKK’s involvement in making 
counterfeit stamps and banknotes. The terrorist group also engaged in cigarette 
and arms smuggling in Turkey’s southeastern region.51 Blood smuggling is an-
other illegal resource for the PKK. Researchers Roth and Sever contend that in a 
period up to and including 2005, the PKK collected 3,000 blood donations from 
Kurdish people under the so-called Kurdish Red Crescent organization. The 
terrorist group claimed that it collected this blood from the Kurdish people for 
charitable aims, but the PKK smuggled the blood out of Turkey, sold it abroad, 
and profited from people’s kindness. Ultimately, the PKK benefited from selling 
the blood both for use in patients and to foreign laboratories for analysis.52
Semi-Legal Business Activities
The PKK conducts legal business through legitimate media, trade, and cultural 
organizations that it has set up or affiliates within Europe. For example, Roj 
TV, the PKK’s leading broadcasting company, located in Denmark, broadcast 
ideological programs for Kurdish people, and Kurdish businessmen supported 
the TV station by sponsoring commercials. Nevertheless, even though Roj TV 
was considered a legal business entity, the PKK founded it with money obtained 
from drug trafficking.53 Therefore, some authorities regard Roj TV as an illegal 
business. In 2012, Roj TV was indicted in Danish court and fined 5.2 million 
Danish crowns (US$894,800) for spreading terrorist propaganda: “The court 
said that between February 2008 and September 2010 the TV channel had 
‘one-sidedly and uncritically disseminated (PKK) messages, including incitement 
to revolt and to join the organization.’ ” 54 
In addition to its broadcasting company, the PKK has several publications in 
Europe and Turkey. The terrorists forcibly sell these publications, especially 
to the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, with threats of violence. The selling prices 
reportedly depend on the buyers’ level of income: the PKK charges a higher 
price to people who make more money.55
The PKK founded its trade and cultural organizations in Europe with the initial 
support of European countries. In addition to serving as financial and political 
bases, these organizations also spread the PKK’s ideology and cover its illegal 
operations. They organize social activities in which the PKK compels Kurdish 
people to participate.56 In other words, these legal organizations are serving as 
illegal extortion operations in practice by forcing people to donate to them. 
Popular Support
The PKK wants to utilize the European Kurdish diaspora’s loyalty, just as the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) exploited Irish-Americans.57 For this reason, it has 
set up charity organizations, such as the Kurdish Red Crescent (Heyva Sor a 
Kurdistanê [HSK]), that collect donations from people in Europe, especially from 
the Kurdish diaspora. Headquartered in Germany, the HSK has a website that 
allows it to collect donations worldwide, ostensibly to distribute funds to poor 
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Kurdish people. In reality, however, it gives the money 
raised from these charitable donations to the PKK. The 
HSK commercials on Roj TV (which has changed its name 
to Stêrk TV) and advertisements in Ozgur Politika (Free 
Policy) newspaper, reveal the organization’s connections 
and cooperation 
with the terrorist 
group.58 Öcalan 
claimed that, in 
the early 1990s, 
the PKK collected 
two million 
deutsche marks as 
donations in one 
campaign alone 
in Germany.59 
Due to the lack 
of public knowl-
edge about the 
connection be-
tween the charity 
organizations and the PKK, the terrorists benefit from the 
goodwill of the Kurdish people and mislead them into 
supporting the terrorists even if they are not sympathizers 
of the PKK. Moreover, it is suspected that pro-PKK mayors 
support the PKK through municipal funds and institutions, 
which means that people’s taxes are being diverted to serve 
as another financial resource for the PKK while the citizens 
suffer from a lack of municipal services.60
The PKK also exploits the religious responsibilities and 
activities of Kurdish people to increase its popular support 
and recruitment. Because most of the Kurdish people 
are Muslim, they have several religious responsibilities 
during the year, such as sadaqat alfitr and zakat—to tithe 
and give money to poor people. Even though the group’s 
Marxist-Leninist ideology contradicts religious beliefs, 
the PKK established the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, 
or Hereketa Islamiya Kurdistane (HIK), to collect this 
religious aid. For this reason, there are few people who 
know about the connection between the HIK and the PKK, 
including even some members of the PKK.61
Possible Countermeasures Turkey Can 
Use against the PKK’s Funding Methods
Turkey has been dealing with PKK terrorism for over 30 
years. Even though Turkey almost brought an end to the 
PKK’s operations several times, it could not completely suc-
ceed due to the substantial support the group was receiving 
from its state sponsors. The decrease in state support in 
recent years, however, has weakened the PKK’s power while 
strengthening the impact of Turkey’s countermeasures 
against the terrorist group. Accordingly, the efforts Turkey 
makes to undermine the PKK’s funding—by countering 
drug trafficking and human smuggling, stopping state 
and popular support, and closing the PKK’s so-called legal 
businesses—will significantly help Turkey achieve its goal 
of ending PKK terrorism.
In the effort to shut down terrorist financing channels, 
states can benefit from studying the past experiences of 
other countries in addition to their own. The experiences 
of Spain, the United Kingdom, Colombia, the United 
States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan demonstrate that 
countermeasures have been most effective when they 
include cutting off state aid to terrorist groups. Examples 
of state aid to foreign insurgencies include French as-
sistance to the Basque separatist group known as ETA 
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), indirect American aid through 
the Irish diaspora to the IRA, and Pakistan’s support of the 
Taliban.62 The foremost action these countries undertook 
to counter terrorist financing methods was to build a 









power to freeze, block, and confiscate the assets of terror-
ists; mandated stricter reporting requirements for banks; 
made it illegal to engage in business with terrorists or their 
supporters; increased the power of judges and law enforce-
ment officers; required government officials to be trained in 
terrorist financing and investigation methods; and obliged 
financial institutions to verify their customers’ lack of any 
relationship to terrorist groups before providing service. In 
addition to increasing the numbers of terrorism financing 
experts and improving coordination between domestic 
government agencies, international cooperation and 
alliances have strengthened all efforts to counter terrorist 
financing.63
Curtailing the Drug Trade
Since the PKK’s primary financial resource is drug traf-
ficking, Turkey should first concentrate its counter-efforts 
on preventing or minimizing this method of funding.64 
Some scholars suggest cost-effective methods that require 
countering only a specific phase of terrorists’ drug traf-
ficking activities to bring the whole enterprise down.65 
Because the PKK organization engages directly or indi-
rectly in every phase of drug trafficking, from cultivation 
and manufacturing to transport and sale, however, Turkey’s 
countermeasures should separately address every phase 
of drug trafficking activities.66 The cost of such counter-
measures should be of secondary importance to Turkey 
because the continuation of PKK terrorism costs more than 
the projected countermeasures, especially considering the 
lives of the thousands of young people that have been lost 
to terrorist acts, crime, and drug addiction. 
To produce better countermeasures against opium cultiva-
tion, Turkey should cooperate with Afghanistan, which 
is the center of the world’s opium production but lacks 
the ability to tackle the problem on its own. A chronic 
lack of security, economic opportunity, and government 
control in large areas of Afghanistan are the primary 
reasons for widespread drug production in the country.67 
Another reason is because, as researcher Feroz Khan 
explains, “opium cultivation is a usual way of living for 
local people.” 68 Because many Afghans make their living 
by cultivating opium, they do not consider the morality of 
their work. 
Afghanistan and Turkey are almost sister countries and 
enjoy a decent and strong relationship that should ensure 
effective cooperation and significant benefits for both 
countries if they work together on drug control. Therefore, 
Turkey should cooperate with Afghanistan in an outreach 
program to change people’s minds about opium produc-
tion. Since the level of literacy is low in Afghanistan,69 
television broadcasting may be a better tool than internet 
sources, books, and magazines to reach individuals. 
Moreover, Afghanistan should more strictly implement 
its legal countermeasures to minimize opium cultivation. 
Although Afghanistan’s government has attempted to 
substitute wheat for opium production, its efforts are not 
close to achieving this objective. Turkey should share its 
experience and data with Afghanistan to increase wheat 
production by lowering the profits of opium cultivation 
through strong countermeasures, providing crop subsidies 
to farmers, deploying agricultural engineers to assist 
farmers to make the transition to licit crops, and creating 
a more suitable environment for wheat production and 
marketing.
Turkey’s involvement in eliminating drug manufacturing 
labs in Afghanistan can also significantly contribute 
to reducing the drug trade. Afghanistan is a safe haven 
for many drug labs, so traffickers need to bring in the 
precursor chemicals required to manufacture heroin from 
raw opium. Preventing these chemicals from reaching 
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Afghanistan therefore is as crucial as stopping the transportation of the manu-
factured drugs. Even though there is a UN convention that addresses precursor 
chemicals (called dual-use because they have many legitimate uses besides the 
processing of illegal drugs), this convention lacks legally binding requirements 
for countries to strictly control their production and sale, and many countries 
have no corresponding domestic laws. Afghanistan does not have a legal frame-
work or an effective system of control for precursor chemicals, which allows 
traffickers to easily and securely transport them within the country.70 Mark 
Colhoun, technical advisor to the UN International Narcotics Control Board, 
reports, “From the cases we have seen, [precursor chemicals] are being smuggled 
[into Afghanistan] as well. Why they are smuggling them in is a mystery because 
they are not controlled, so they could just ship them over a border.” 71 
To address this lack of control, Turkey should encourage and help Afghanistan 
to enact laws to regulate the circulation of dual-use precursor chemicals within 
the country. In addition, Turkey could assign experienced military and law 
enforcement personnel to Afghanistan to share its experience in controlling and 
preventing the diversion of dual-use chemicals. Furthermore, traffickers’ commu-
nication with industrial suppliers creates vulnerabilities, which make it possible 
for Afghan officials to gather intelligence on traffickers’ activities.72 As a trusted 
ally, Turkey can also request particular intelligence and GPS data from the 
United States to allow Afghan forces to conduct instant operations that target 
opium fields and mobile labs.73 Thus, by causing substantial damage to both drug 
production and manufacturing activities, Turkey and Afghanistan can under-
mine drug trafficking at the beginning of the process. By helping Afghanistan, in 
turn, Turkey would also be preventing the PKK from funding itself through the 
drug trade.
Border Security
To forestall the PKK’s drug trafficking and human smuggling, Turkey also needs 
to improve the effectiveness of its border security system. Because smuggling—
human smuggling in particular—is often conducted through the Mediterranean 
Sea, “border security system” in this context refers to both land and marine 
border security. The prevention of human and other smuggling is as critical as 
the prevention of drug trafficking, because extorting smugglers is another of 
the PKK’s fundraising methods. 
The mountainous geography of Turkey’s southeastern border region is 
a serious challenge for border security, especially because terror-
ists and smugglers typically conduct their activities under 
the cover of darkness, which makes visual detection very 
difficult. To eliminate this disadvantage, security officials 
should have access to a variety of current technological 
equipment, including thermal imaging cameras, night 
vision scopes and goggles, x-ray control devices, and mobile 
surveillance systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 
Turkey already uses UAVs in surveillance activities, but it should 
increase their numbers and the number of operators to improve overall surveil-
lance capabilities on the borders. Additionally, x-ray car scanners that are able to 
scan big and long trucks are essential at every border crossing. These machines 
are quite useful in detecting contraband goods, and they save valuable time and 
help increase security at busy, crowded border crossings. Longer wait times can 
A peshmerga border guard directs 
traffic in the road while a driver waits.
A Turkish forces’ armoured vehicle 
patrols the Turkey-Syria border.
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also negatively affect the flow of trade. Dogs trained to 
search for narcotics are significantly effective in finding 
contraband, but they are able to work for only a limited 
time—approximately 30 minutes once or twice a day—so 
increasing their numbers at border crossings could be even 
more helpful. Finally, border security officials should have 
an extensive archive of statistics available to them. With 
the help of this kind of information, officials could pin-
point days or weeks when the capture rates for narcotics 
have historically been high, identify border posts that have 
detected specific types of prohibited items or have par-
ticularly high rates of interdiction, and detect when transit 
density increases at certain crossing gates. Making this data 
available to border personnel could greatly improve the 
effectiveness of border security.
The Power of Media
To undermine the PKK’s drug trafficking activities, Turkey 
should also use the power of outreach. Drug trafficking 
ultimately causes serious harm 
to human health, so terrorist 
organizations like the PKK do 
not want the public, especially 
their supporters, to know about 
the group’s involvement in the 
drug trade.74 Although the PKK’s 
drug trafficking is well known 
to government officials, the 
military, and police officers, the 
civilian population in Turkey 
is largely unfamiliar with this 
aspect of its affairs. To increase people’s awareness of the 
PKK’s criminal activities in the region, Turkey’s government 
could produce documentaries and TV series that expose 
the PKK’s covert activities. Broadcast channels can allocate 
a significant amount of time to cover the PKK’s criminal 
activities. Many people in Turkey watch TV shows and the 
news on a daily basis, so informing people through these 
broadcasts would be fast, easy, and effective. In addition, 
government officials and senior leadership can disclose the 
PKK’s involvement in illegal activities in their speeches. 
Increasing public awareness of the PKK’s connection to 
the drug trade would cause the terrorist group to lose 
credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters and 
sympathizers and consequently, much popular support.
Eliminating the PKK’s money laundering activities and lim-
iting its financial transactions can have a profound impact 
on the group’s financing. After making inordinate amounts 
of money from its illegal fundraising methods, the PKK 
must convert its funds into “legitimate” resources through 
laundering. Turkey should enact strict laws against money 
laundering, as has been done in a number of countries, 
including Spain, the UK, Colombia, and the United States. 
Accordingly, Turkey should revise its current money 
laundering laws to improve law enforcement’s ability to 
freeze, block, and confiscate the assets of suspected or 
known terrorists, and it should require the reporting and 
recording of large bank transactions to prevent citizens 
from doing business with terrorists or their supporters. 
This reporting requirement would increase scrutiny of 
existing terrorist bank accounts as well. Writing these laws 
is not enough, however; the laws must then be enforced. 
The lack of prosecutions and convictions related to money 
laundering crimes up until recently seems to indicate that 
Turkey is failing in this area.75 
The Turkish government needs to coordinate the imple-
mentation of anti–money-laundering laws among its 
institutions to ensure the effectiveness of such financial 
countermeasures. As a member of the multinational Finan-
cial Action Task Force (FATF),76 Turkey should increase its 
international cooperation efforts. 
Turkey currently falls within the 
category of Improving Global Anti-
Money Laundering/Countering 
Terrorist Financing Compliance.77 
Taking the further countermeasures 
recommended here would serve 
to improve Turkey’s ranking and 
categorization within the FATF 
and further enable it to counter 
the PKK’s financing. Also, Turkey’s 
efforts to follow Spain and Colom-
bia’s leads in increasing its number of counterterrorism 
experts would contribute to the success of the country’s 
anti–money-laundering activities. For this reason, Turkey 
should improve the national security and counterterrorism 
departments in its universities and increase the number 
of these departments nationwide. Finally, Turkey should 
implement effective financial oversight of the municipal 
expenditures of its city mayors, to prevent pro-PKK mayors 
from abusing their authority by diverting public funds to 
the PKK.78
Ending State Sponsorship
Finally, the experiences of Turkey itself and other countries 
prove that the prevention of state sponsorships is pivotal 
to ensuring the effectiveness of countermeasures. The 
decrease in state support in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
diminished the PKK’s strength and subsequently the 
number of its terrorist attacks, but the PKK has continued 
to enjoy some forms of state aid.79 Turkey should follow 
a zero-tolerance policy against state aid. The PKK’s camps 
DOCUMENTARIES 
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in Iraq and Syria prove that these countries serve as safe 
havens. Turkey can implement sanctions against the state 
sponsors of the PKK by leveraging its considerable political 
and economic power in the region. In spite of state sponsor-
ship’s covert nature, Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency 
should be able to identify the countries that support the 
PKK directly or indirectly. Furthermore, Turkey should be 
wary about the role that Western countries have given the 
Kurds to combat extremist groups such as the so-called 
Islamic State (aka ISIS or ISIL) in the Middle East, because 
aid to the Kurdish people can become a new type of finan-
cial resource for the PKK.80 
Ending the Flow of Charity Money
Because the PKK uses its drug trafficking money to create 
so-called legal businesses and charity organizations, Turkey 
should also take precautions 
against these entities’ support 
for the PKK. As described earlier, 
the Kurdish Red Crescent (HSK), 
which collects donations from 
people in Europe, does not use 
the collected money to help 
poor and needy Kurdish people. 
Instead, it delivers the money 
directly to the PKK terrorists and 
its supporters. If people knew 
about the relationship between 
the two organizations, they 
probably would not donate to the 
HSK. Turkey should therefore 
take steps to increase people’s 
awareness through a media 
outlet that broadcasts in Turkish, 
Kurdish, and English. The Turkish 
authorities should encourage 
broadcasters to promote special 
programs regarding the PKK’s 
so-called charity and business 
organizations. Moreover, magazines, newspapers, and 
journals should be encouraged to talk about the PKK’s 
relationship with these organizations. Although these so-
called legal organizations have been operating in Europe, 
European countries are not responding adequately to stop 
them. Turkey should inform European countries about the 
HSK and other organizations’ relationship with the PKK by 
providing documents and intelligence data and increasing 
its partnership and cooperation with Europe. Turkey 
should also appeal to the EU to conduct stricter oversight 
of suspect organizations and close those organizations that 
are affiliated with the terrorist group. 
Conclusion
Like any other organization, the PKK needs to look for 
ways to survive and continue its activities. Therefore, 
it tries to maintain stable, lucrative financial sources to 
sustain it. As changing regional and global conditions over 
the past 30 years caused state sponsorship to diminish, the 
group was forced to look for new funding sources, pri-
marily from illegal activities. Its success in making this shift 
reflects the PKK’s strong organizational ability to adapt to 
changing conditions to survive, just as other human com-
munities do. Stanley Milgram explains the role of survival 
in human behavior: 
Behavior, like any other of man’s characteris-
tics, has through successive generations been 
shaped by the requirements of survival. Be-
haviors that did not enhance 
the chances of survival were 
successively bred out of the 
organism because they led to 
the eventual extinction of the 
groups that displayed them.81
Similarly, the requirements of 
PKK’s survival shaped its choices 
of funding sources, such as drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, and 
extortion. 
To counter the PKK’s funding 
streams, Turkey can benefit from 
the experiences of other countries 
that have fought against ter-
rorism and adopt a broad strategy 
that begins with a robust legal 
framework and related regulations. 
Experience shows that financial 
countermeasures can begin to 
work when state support to 
terrorist organizations is stopped. Turkey should aim to 
disrupt the PKK’s drug trafficking operations, the group’s 
most lucrative resource, by targeting every phase, from 
cultivation and manufacturing to trafficking and selling. 
To achieve this objective, it should form partnerships to 
ensure regional and international cooperation. Turkey also 
needs to improve the effectiveness of its border security 
by employing more advanced technology, increasing the 
authority of its government officers, and enacting stronger 
laws. To decrease the popular support of the PKK, Turkey 
should use the power of media to inform the public of the 
PKK’s involvement in the drug trade and reveal the illicit 
IRAQ AND SYRIA 
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relationships between quasi-legal businesses and charity organizations, and the 
terrorist group. The PKK’s operations as a transnational criminal organization 
are a threat for European countries as well. Therefore, Turkey should convince 
European countries to cooperate with it to counter the PKK’s influence within 
Europe. 
In conclusion, the struggle to close down financing sources is vital to combating 
terrorism. Although attacking its funding alone might not stop the PKK’s 
violence, success in this area would support other military, political, and social 
countermeasures, and perhaps finally end PKK terrorism in Turkey. v
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Figure 1: Countries Affected by the LRA Insurgency
3
The Movers and Shakers of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army
MAJ David Munyua,  
Uganda People’s Defence Force 
The Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M or simply LRA), 
founded in the late 1980s, is a Ugandan insurgent group that operated primarily 
out of the northern and eastern part of Uganda until 2006. After 2006, under 
pressure from counterinsurgency operations, the group relocated to the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and eventually moved into the Central 
African Republic (CAR) via the Republic of South Sudan. Based on reports of 
its activities, the LRA is also suspected to be present in Sudan and southeastern 
Chad (see figure 1). Most of the LRA’s fighters, including leader Joseph Kony, 
come from the Acholi tribe of northern Uganda, and the insurgents received 
passive support from tribal communities for many years. Local popular support 
dried up, however, when the LRA started committing atrocities against its own 
tribal members. The heinous violence the LRA unleashed against the Acholi 
earned the insurgents the status of a terrorist group according to both Uganda 
and the United States’ definitions of terrorism.1
By 2014, the LRA’s fighting capacity had been largely degraded by the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF), working jointly with the militaries of South 
Sudan, the CAR, and the DRC in an alliance called the African Union Regional 
Task Force (AURTF). The LRA does not pose as great a threat to Uganda as it did 
10 years ago. However, it continues to commit atrocities against the people of 
the countries in which it is currently located. The greatest obstacle in the fight 
against the LRA is the lack of a front line where the LRA can be located and 
destroyed. By operating in scattered groups of three to 12 fighters, each with its  
own commander who determines the movements and opera-
tions of the group, the LRA has effectively become invisible.2 
This has made tracking and destroying even the weakened LRA  
a very daunting task.
The purpose of this article is to identify the most influential 
players in the current LRA command structure. Knowing the 
identities of the individuals who are most responsible for the 
LRA’s survival will help counterinsurgency planners devise the 
best possible strategies to finally end the LRA menace in the 
region. 
This article has five sections. First, I describe the background 
of the LRA insurgency in Uganda and the reasons it has flour-
ished in central Africa; second, I clearly define the objectives 
and limitations of my research; and third, I structure, analyze, 
and evaluate the data that I collected in the course of my research, using social 
network analysis tools. In the fourth section, I use the results of my analysis to 
devise strategic options, and in the final section, I draw conclusions and offer 
recommendations for the way forward. While social network analysis tools are 
not an end in themselves, their use can contribute important information for 
crafting winning strategies against intractable problems such as the LRA.
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An Abbreviated History of the LRA Insurgency
In 1986, the insurgent National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA), led by 
Yoweri Museveni, overthrew the Ugandan government of Tito Okello. Okello, 
an ethnic Acholi, fled the country, and many of his tribe members took refuge 
in neighboring Sudan. These displaced people later regrouped as the Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) and launched a counteroffensive against the 
NRA government in Uganda with the support of the Sudanese government.4
In that same year, 1986, as the NRA was still trying to settle in as a government, 
an Acholi priestess called Alice Auma formed a separate rebel group. Auma 
called herself “Lakwena,” meaning “messenger,” because she proclaimed herself to 
be a mystical spiritual conduit to the Acholi people. Her Holy Spirit Movement 
(also called the Holy Spirit Mobile Force) fought against the NRA and captured 
a substantial part of eastern Uganda. In 1987, however, Lakwena’s army was 
defeated, and Lakwena and some of her followers fled to Kenya, where she died 
from illness in 2007.5
Meanwhile, the UPDA 
continued the fight against 
the NRA government until 
1988, when its leaders finally 
decided to sign a peace 
agreement that disbanded 
the UPDA. Per the terms of 
the agreement, members of 
the UPDA were incorporated 
into the government military 
forces. This agreement 
also temporarily halted 
Sudanese support to the 
Ugandan insurgent group. 
Some individuals within the UPDA nevertheless did not accept the terms of the 
agreement and decided to form a breakaway UPDA force. Joseph Kony, who was 
the commanding officer of the UPDA’s so-called Black Battalion and a relative 
of Alice Auma Lakwena, was one of these dissidents. He formed the Uganda 
People’s Democratic Christian Army, which was partly an offshoot of Lakwena’s 
rebel group. In 1992, Kony’s rebel army and some of the other UPDA breakaway 
members decided to form a united front against the NRA. The Lord’s Resistance 
Army thus came into being with Joseph Kony as its leader.6
The LRA reactivated its connection with the Sudanese Armed Forces so as to 
receive military supplies and special training from the Sudanese government. 
Ugandan president Museveni was a former classmate of John Garang, the leader 
of the Sudanese insurgent group called the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA), and the two of them also renewed their ties. In essence, the insurgencies 
turned into a proxy war, with the LRA and Sudanese Armed Forces fighting 
against Kampala, while the SPLA and Uganda’s NRA fought together against 
Khartoum. This status persisted until 2005, when the game finally changed.7
On 8 October 1995, Uganda enacted a new constitution that transformed the 
NRA forces into a national military called the Uganda People’s Defence Force.8 
This was primarily a change of name; the force’s operations and routine activities 
remained unchanged, and it continued the fight against the LRA.
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The comprehensive peace agreement that was signed between the Sudanese  
government and the SPLA in 2005 finally changed the status quo in the proxy 
war. The LRA not only lost its ally, but the cross-border sanctuary that LRA 
fighters had been using to escape from the Ugandan military shifted to the 
control of the SPLA—an enemy of the LRA by extension. LRA leaders thus had 
to choose between entering into peace talks with the Ugandan government or 
relocating to yet another safe haven. They chose both options but prioritized 
relocation. Given how events unfolded thereafter, one may plausibly argue that 
the LRA used the peace talks to make good their escape.9 
While peace talks were being held in Juba, South Sudan, in 2006, attended 
by the LRA’s so-called “external wing,” the LRA’s fighters quietly relocated to 
Garamba National Park in the DRC. By late 2007, the peace talks had concluded 
with an agreement that was to be signed in Juba. To the astonishment of 
many, including the LRA negotiators, however, Kony decided to abandon the 
agreement at the last minute. The International Criminal Court had issued a 
warrant for the arrest of Kony and his top four commanders in July 2005, and 
Kony wanted the charges against him and his commanders dropped before he 
put his signature to the agreement. There were also reports that Kony was not 
actually interested in the peace agreement but was using it to buy time for his 
forces to regroup. He therefore had to find a reason to avoid signing, and this 
was the best excuse he had.10 
In 2008, Uganda responded by launching a concerted attack, dubbed “Opera-
tion Lightning Thunder,” on the LRA positions in the DRC. The LRA was 
dispersed, and some of its members fled into the CAR, Sudan’s Darfur region, 
and parts of Chad. At the time of this writing, LRA members are suspected to 
be located in these three countries as well as parts of South Sudan.11
The Structure of this Study
There are a lot of data about the LRA in open sources, which makes it easy for re-
searchers to get “lost in the weeds” if they are not very clear on what they want to 
know about the terrorist group. For this article, I focus on the LRA’s commanders 
(also called actors here) and command structure. Even with the wealth of 
open-source information about the most influential LRA commanders, however, 
it can still be difficult to find the most recent roll of their names. Furthermore, 
the group has been in hiding for so many years that previously important com-
manders are aging out of their positions, while others may be dead. I therefore 
suspect that the LRA has developed a new generation of commanders—most 
likely those individuals who were born and/or raised in the bush as child sol-
diers. The bad news is that there is very little public information available about 
these feral younger men, and because the only “normal” life they know is bush 
life, it will be harder for counterinsurgency forces to deal with them.
I used social network analysis software to process the available data on the LRA 
command structure.12 My goal was to identify the most influential commanders 
within the LRA, especially because they are the ones who most likely have been 
responsible for the terrorist group’s survival in the bush over the past quarter 
century. This kind of data analysis may also provide hints about the next genera-
tion of LRA commanders. As a result, CT planners should also be able to derive 
working strategies to counter and eventually end the LRA insurgency.
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Structuring, Analyzing, and Evaluating the Data
Social network analysis tools require the researcher to 
code and enter the data in a format that is understandable 
to and can be manipulated by the tools. Once this step 
is completed, the researcher can analyze the same data in 
a number of different ways. For this study, I coded two 
datasets specifically on the LRA commanders. The first 
set is based on the relationships among the commanders, 
both the command positions to which they are appointed 
by the senior LRA leadership, and their relationships to 
each other through friendship or other affiliation. As in 
a regular army, LRA commanders do not choose the unit 
or subgroup they will command; Kony alone decides who 
will command which group and also assigns the fighters to 
their units within the LRA organizational structure. Out-
side of the command structure, however, the commanders 
tend to form “cliques” based primarily on personal ties 
of friendship and loyalty. Understanding how these two 
groups relate and differ will help researchers identify the 
most influential commanders and their close affiliates.
The second set of data that I coded concerns two specific 
attributes for each commander. First is the current physical 
status of the individual commander: alive, dead, alive and 
captured, or alive and surrendered. Those in the latter 
categories of captured or surrendered are useful to study 
because they may still have some influence on their former 
cadres, especially if they become part of the government’s 
outreach programs. The second attribute is the LRA offi-
cer’s function within the command structure: is he a field 
commander or in some non-command–related position 
such as staff officer? Those who are still alive and are, or 
were, in positions of command over the fighting forces are 
the ones I focus on for further study.
The analysis process typically starts with basic descriptive 
statistics about the LRA command network: first a calcula-
tion of correlations between the two relational datasets 
(command structure and personal cliques), and then an 
aggregated version derived from the two. The results show 
that the relational datasets are highly correlated and that 
all the LRA commanders are linked to each other regardless 
of how the LRA leadership deploys them. In other words, 
I should get similar results when I analyze any one of the 
relational datasets independently of the others. 
The second step in the analysis is the topographical 
analysis. This analysis is based on the overall structure 
of the networks (the relational datasets) and is designed 
to ascertain the density (interconnectedness) and the 
centralization (hierarchical arrangement) of the networks. 
The result of the analysis shows that the LRA’s networks 




are generally not very dense but are relatively centralized; in other words, the command structure is not closely integrated 
at the personal level, but it is fairly hierarchical. The sociogram in figure 2 is a summary map of the entire LRA command 
structure, 48 persons in all, based on the information available from open sources. The blue nodes indicate actors who are 
no longer a threat, that is, commanders who are either dead, captured, or surrendered. The red nodes indicate actors who 
are still a threat because they are alive and free. The symbols indicate three things; first, the large “+” sign indicates an actor 
who is deceased; second, the large red and blue circles denote actors who fill or filled the role of commander; and third, 
the small “+”and small red and blue circles denote actors who are not (or were not) commanders. 
The third step in the analysis process is to determine the centrality of each commander in the network. For this step, I used 
four different types of centrality measures: (1) degree centrality, which measures the number of other people an actor is linked 
to; (2) closeness centrality, which measures how close an actor is (based on path distance), on average, to all other actors in the 
network; (3) betweenness centrality, which measures how “central” each actor is to the network—in other words, the degree 
to which he lies on the shortest path to all other actors in the network; and (4) eigenvector centrality, which is based on the 
assumption that actors who are tied to highly central actors are more important than those who are tied to peripheral actors. 
This analysis, therefore, weighs the sum of an actor’s ties to other actors by his centrality scores.14 Table 1 shows the output of 
the centrality measures from an analysis of an extract of LRA commanders who are known to be alive, regardless of whether 
they are still in the bush or in custody.
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Table 1: Centrality Measures for LRA Commanders’ Network
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The seven individuals whose names are marked in red consistently rank within the list of the top 10 actors for all the cen-
trality measures. The first category includes Joseph Kony, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen, which is not surprising 
because these individuals are all LRA commanders who are on the International Criminal Court’s wanted list.16 In contrast, 
the names in the second category, which includes Alphonse Lamola, Onencan Aciro Kop, Richard (no last name), and 
John Bosco Kibwola, were surprising to me, because the first three in particular had not appeared in news reports about 
LRA activities. Kibwola only started to show up in the news in 2007, following the collapse of the Juba peace negotiations.
When I narrowed the group of the most influential living LRA actors in table 1 down to those who are active commanders, 
mostly the same names showed up. The exceptions were Alphonse Lamola, who was excluded because he is not a com-
mander, and Olanya David, a new entrant in the top seven, who is Kony’s paternal half-brother. David scored low in 
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betweenness centrality, however. There is a report that he 
was demoted by his brother Kony after impregnating one 
of Kony’s wives, which may explain his inability to main-
tain close ties to other important actors.17 
One interesting item that emerged from this analysis is the 
structure of two competing factions that exist within the 
LRA leadership. One is led by Dominic Ongwen and the 
other by Joseph Kony. These two fell out after Kony or-
dered the execution of his longtime deputy, Vincent Otti. 
Otti had indicated that he was willing to talk peace with 
the Ugandan government. Kony, who was against the idea, 
feared that peace talks would cause the LRA to disintegrate. 
Ongwen had been very loyal to Otti, and many of Otti’s 
followers in turn became loyal to Ongwen.
Strategic Options
Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton, in their paper “Strate-
gies for Combating Dark Networks,” outlined two broad 
categories of strategic options that can be used to disrupt 
a terrorist or insurgent network. The first is a kinetic ap-
proach, which is a proactive and aggressive action against 
enemy combatants and their 
supporters with the intent to 
neutralize, capture, or kill them. 
The kinetic approach targets the 
key actors directly or uses third-
party agents to do the targeting. 
In both cases, the ultimate goal is 
to remove central nodes or bro-
kers, or it may involve breaking 
key ties within the network to 
disrupt the rest of the network.18
The second approach is nonkinetic, and thus less aggres-
sive. It involves a more subtle and patient use of national 
power, including diplomacy, information, and economic 
incentives, with the intent to undermine the dark network 
through cooperation and collaboration with partners, 
while emphasizing a flexible rather than prescriptive 
approach. The overall objective of this strategic approach 
is to secure the safety and support of the population while 
undermining the dark network’s influence and control 
over them.
The Kinetic Approach
The LRA commanders who may be considered for targeting 
are the eight whom I identified as being the most important 
through the use of social network analysis tools: Joseph 
Kony, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Onencan 
Aciro Kop, Richard, John Bosco Kibwola, Olanya David, 
and Alphonse Lamola. Because these individuals are very 
influential in the LRA network, it is likely that if they were 
captured or killed, the LRA would not be able to continue 
the insurgency or even survive. There are two possible 
approaches to a kinetic solution: the AURTF can continue 
to hunt the men directly, or it 
can try sending surrendered LRA 
fighters back into the bush to “take 
them out” one at a time. Although 
many LRA commanders have been 
killed by regular forces over the 
past 20 years or so, direct targeting 
has become less effective since the 
LRA went into hiding and became 
“invisible.” Without a front line 
where the AURTF can face off with 
the LRA, the fight has become a 
game of hide-and-seek. The option 
to have surrendered LRA members 
sneak back in and kill the com-
manders is a recommendation that 
is yet to be tested.
The Nonkinetic Approach 
The nonkinetic strategies that 
are applicable in the fight against 
the LRA are institution building, 
psychological operations, and 
rehabilitation.19 Information 
operations will not work against 
the group because, since 2009, the 
LRA has not used any traceable 
form of electronic communication. 
THE SECOND 
APPROACH 
INVOLVES A SUBTLE 
AND PATIENT USE 
OF NATIONAL 
POWER.
A Ugandan soldier hunts LRA rebels.
May 2015
35
The commanders rely on runners to communicate among 
themselves, which has rendered the use of high-tech systems 
like satellite tracking to locate them irrelevant.20
Institution building involves empowering local communi-
ties with strong administrative systems that can organize 
citizens to resist the insurgents. It also involves giving the 
villages the means to call in immediate military help when 
they need it. One of the difficulties facing villagers in the 
DRC, CAR, and South Sudan is the lack of any reliable 
means to quickly report LRA attacks to the AURTF. Most 
of the time, such information reaches the AURTF long after 
the LRA has committed its atroci-
ties and disappeared again.21 As part 
of the institution-building strategy, 
each village would need to have a 
minimum of two fast-link commu-
nications systems to connect with 
the AURTF. This also implies that 
the AURTF should have the capacity 
to reach every village as quickly as 
possible. The deplorable roads and 
dense jungle terrain of the region, 
however, are likely to impede the 
implementation of this strategy.
Psychological operations (PsyOps) in-
volve the dissemination of selected 
information for the purpose of 
influencing the emotions, percep-
tions, attitudes, objective reasoning, 
and, in the end, the behavior of 
the targeted individual or group. 
The ultimate aim here is to align 
the thinking and behavior of the 
targeted group or individual with 
that of the institution projecting 
the PsyOps.22 This strategy can be 
used to counter the propaganda 
LRA leaders use to influence their 
forces against the Ugandan govern-
ment. For example, captured LRA 
fighters have asserted that while in the jungles without 
access to other sources of information, their commanders 
would tell the fighters that they would be killed if they 
surrendered or happened to be captured by the UPDF. 
To counter this misinformation, Uganda is now using 
captured and surrendered commanders and fighters to talk 
to their former LRA colleagues through radio talk shows. 
The aim here is to discredit the LRA propaganda and at the 
same time influence LRA fighters to consider surrendering 
to the UPDF or AURTF.23
As mentioned earlier, my social network analysis identi-
fied two rival factions within the LRA. The faction led by 
Dominic Ongwen could be influenced to push against the 
Joseph Kony faction, which would thus destabilize the LRA 
leadership network. This can be achieved by promising 
Ongwen, a more liberal commander, that he will be given 
amnesty if he gives up fighting and returns home with 
his group. Alternatively, the Ugandan government could 
announce over the radio that it is in contact with Ongwen 
or Okot Odhiambo, another potential rival. Kony is likely 
to believe the deception and react by turning against these 
key commanders, which could 
result in the disintegration of 
the LRA. If there is infighting 
within the LRA leadership, the 
number of fighters who choose 
to surrender will likely increase. 
Rehabilitation of captured or 
surrendered members of the 
LRA’s dark network would help 
to ideologically reorient the 
fighters away from extremism 
and reintegrate them into civil 
society.24 Uganda is already using 
this strategy. All of the captured 
and surrendered LRA combat-
ants who apply for amnesty are 
given ideological reorientation, 
trained in vocational institutions 
to empower them with social 
survival skills, and assisted with 
funds to start private businesses, 
if that is what they wish to do. 
The Acholi also have a cultural 
cleansing ritual that the LRA 
combatants go through before 
they are reintegrated into tribal 
society. Those who wish to join 
the military are taken through 
military training, a process that 
includes ideological reorientation, after which they are 
integrated and deployed just like other UPDF personnel.25 
Conclusion and Recommendations
Although social network analysis tools have limitations, 
they can be used effectively by coupling information de-
rived from the tools with other research and analysis. For 
instance, intelligence reports are normally inconclusive, 
but with the support of tools such as those used for this 
study, a commander would be able to identify the “movers 
and shakers” of a target organization and develop effective 
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strategies on how to solve a network-related problem. If counterterrorism opera-
tors have a plan in place to target individual commanders within the LRA, this 
paper has clearly defined the priority list.
When it comes to choosing strategies to undermine the LRA, I recommend using 
the PsyOps and rehabilitation strategies concurrently. The chief problem with 
the PsyOps strategy is establishing communication with the LRA combatants. 
Currently, the Ugandan government is only assuming that the LRA actually 
listens to the radio talk shows it broadcasts. Although captured and surrendered 
LRA combatants have attested to the fact that active LRA members do listen, 
only a few of these might actually have access to broadcast radio receivers. Kony’s 
ban on the use of electronic gadgets might also apply to radios. Nevertheless, this 
option remains the single most potentially effective strategy for Uganda to rely 
on. Kinetic strategies have been tried before and are still in place, but because the 
LRA commanders have gone underground, it has become increasingly difficult to 
implement such strategies.
Another obstacle I foresee will arise when the younger LRA commanders take 
up the mantle of the LRA from the existing, aging leadership. Kony has already 
appointed his son, who was born and raised in the jungles, as his deputy, and 
may be in the process of transforming the leadership of the LRA.26 The bad news 
about the younger commanders is that most of them were either abducted when 
they were very young or born in the bush. That means they have no more than a 
faint idea of what life is like in towns and villages, and it will be that much harder 
to talk them out of the jungles. Some of them do not have any family members 
left, so the incentive for them to return home is limited, if not entirely absent. 
Others simply fear retribution from people they hurt during the conflict if they 
were to return home.
The open-source literature on the LRA is silent about this younger generation of 
LRA commanders. As the years go by, the commanders discussed in this paper 
are becoming older and less effective. It is therefore incumbent upon the CT 
community to strive to know the next generation of LRA commanders and keep 
abreast of developments in the LRA structure, so as to develop better strategies to 
counter them.
As I finished writing this article, I saw press reports that Dominic Ongwen 
had surrendered to US Army Special Forces working with African forces in  
the CAR.27 This news is a game changer: as this study makes clear, Ongwen 
was an influential actor within the LRA who could be used to bring more LRA 
fighters out of the bush—if the Ugandan government chooses to use him in  
that way. v
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Do not fight the war that fits your organization and weapon, but 
choose your way of fighting, then build your system.1
Since the current Ukrainian crisis began in February 2014, 
“hybrid warfare” has become a hot topic once again.2 The term was coined and 
gained traction in military strategic thinking after Hezbollah’s success against 
Israel in the Second Lebanon War in 2006. In preparation for that conflict, 
Hezbollah constructed artfully concealed fortified positions, tunnel systems, 
underground medical centers, and large caches of pre-positioned weapons and 
ammunitions.3 Because the war had no direct effect on European nations or 
the United States, however, the hybrid warfare concept did not receive much 
attention at the time. 
Now, with the reemergence of an expansionist Russia and its nontraditional 
approach to warfare at Europe’s doorstep, the situation seems to have changed 
dramatically. Russia’s leaders have adapted and simultaneously applied both 
conventional and unconventional methods, including traditional and irregular 
forces that are supported by new technologies and the state’s political and eco-
nomic power, while allowing Moscow to maintain some degree of plausible deni-
ability. NATO members, along with several countries outside of the alliance, have 
been showing great interest in the Russian concept of hybrid warfare because of 
their increasing fear that the pattern of aggression used against Ukraine is the 
harbinger of a new mode of armed conflict, for which none of them is prepared.
As a result of the increasing prevalence of hybrid warfare, Western academics 
and think tanks have been trying very actively to define the term and identify its 
core principles. In 2006, the authors of the US Quadrennial Defense Review for-
mally recognized the existence of a hybrid threat, but there still is no consensus 
on how to understand or define what that means.4 To establish a conceptual 
framework for the discussion in this article, it is useful to examine some of the 
existing definitions.
Back in 2007, strategist Nathan Freier proposed a “quad chart” of four threat 
types: traditional, irregular, catastrophic terrorist, and disruptive; a hybrid 
threat would be some combination of two or more of these.5 Counterinsurgency 
expert David Kilcullen envisions hybrid warfare as “the best description for 
today’s modern conflict,” but unlike Freier, “he emphasizes combinations of 
irregular modes of conflict, including civil wars, insurgency, and terrorism.” 6 
Retired Army Col. Jack McCuen’s description of hybrid warfare focuses on the 
asymmetric battle, “fought on three decisive battlegrounds ‘within the conflict 
zone population, the home front population and the international community.’” 
This definition highlights the importance of the “battle of the narratives” and 
emphasizes modern information technology and mass mobilization.7 In their 
recent study on hybrid warfare for the Joint Special Operations University, 
May 2015
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Timothy McCulloh and Richard Johnson describe hybrid war theory as “a form 
of warfare in which one of the combatants bases its optimized force structure 
on the combination of all available resources—both conventional and uncon-
ventional—in a unique cultural context to produce specific, synergistic effects 
against a conventionally-based opponent.” 8
Besides the theorists’ ideas, there are numerous official definitions as well. British 
military doctrine describes hybrid warfare as a variation of irregular warfare. 
Hybrid warfare is conducted by irregular forces that have access to 
the more sophisticated weapons and systems normally fielded by 
regular forces. Hybrid warfare may morph and adapt throughout an 
individual campaign, as circumstances and resources allow. It is an-
ticipated that irregular groups will continue to acquire sophisticated 
weapons and technologies and that intervention forces will need to 
confront a variety of threats that have in the past been associated 
primarily with the regular Armed Forces of states.9
Israel defines hybrid warfare as a method of social warfare. According to the 
Israeli vision, “hybrid threats not only gain a physical advantage through the 
combination of conventional technology and organization with unconven-
tional tactics and applications, but also gain a cognitive advantage by the very 
lack of social restrictions that conventional state forces must adhere to such as 
the Law of Land Warfare, Geneva Convention, and Rules of Engagement.” 10
For its part, NATO draws on several of these ideas to define hybrid threats 
broadly as “those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously 
employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of 
their objectives.” 11 This article proposes an alternative approach for Eastern 
European countries to counter the Russian hybrid threat and therefore draws 
on the NATO definition.
At its summit in Wales in 2014, NATO conducted in-depth discussions on the 
topic of hybrid warfare and came up with its own ideas to effectively counter this 
threat, such as the Readiness Action Plan, a policy document outlining measures 
primarily to shore up defenses in the member states that lie closest to Russia,  and 
the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).  
The Readiness Action Plan agreed [to] by Heads of State and 
Government at the Wales Summit is a response to the changed and 
broader security environment in and near Europe. It responds to 
the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications. It 
also responds to the risks and threats emanating from our southern 
neighborhood, the Middle East and North Africa. Its implementa-
tion will significantly enhance NATO’s readiness and responsive-
ness and will ... strengthen both NATO’s collective defense and crisis 
management capability.12
The VJTF is envisioned as a “spearhead” force within the existing NATO Response 
Force, “able to deploy at very short notice, particularly at the periphery of 
NATO’s territory. The VJTF should consist of a land component with appropriate 
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demonstrate a commendable level of adaptation, but they also share one 
common theme: they seek to counter Russia’s hybrid warfare concept through 
existing defense structures, and they are based on our current understanding of 
warfare. General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, recently 
described the changes in the character of armed conflicts from a Russian 
perspective (see figure 1). In light of his points, it becomes clear that NATO’s ap-
proach will not necessarily meet the challenges posed by this new form of threat.
Taking all of the characteristics described by Gerasimov into account, it is 
paramount for the Eastern European members of NATO to not only sustain their 
NATO membership, but also to review their national security strategies and de-
velop a more self-reliant approach than the one they currently depend on. Most, 
if not all, of NATO’s Eastern European allies have been simplifying their defense 
policies and reducing the size of their militaries in the expectation that NATO 
will “roll in” to guarantee their sovereignty in the event of invasion. The charac-
teristics of Russia’s future conflicts, as described by Gerasimov, however, might 
prevent such action. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s founding 
document, states that “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more 
of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all.” 15 As Russian operations in Crimea and eastern Ukraine since February 2014 
have demonstrated, the emerging form of warfare may lack a definitive armed 
attack. If a NATO member were to find itself in a situation similar to Ukraine’s, 
to what extent would NATO’s legal framework and instruments be able to handle 
it? The North Atlantic Treaty could easily produce a situation whereby some 
of NATO’s military forces were willing to fight for a member’s sovereignty, but 
were unable to do so because they lacked the military capacity or political will 
to do so.16 Despite—or because of—these potential obstacles to coordinated 
Traditional  
Military Methods New Military Methods
 ¡ Military action starts after 
strategic deployment (declara-
tion of war).
 ¡ Frontal clashes between large 
units consisting mostly of 
ground units.
 ¡ Defeat of manpower, firepower, 
taking control of regions and 
borders to gain territorial 
control.
 ¡ Destruction of economic power 
and territorial annexation.
 ¡ Combat operations on land, air, 
and sea.
 ¡ Management of troops by rigid 
hierarchy and governance.
 ¡ Military action starts by groups of troops 
during peactime (war is not declared at all).
 ¡ Non-contact clashes between highly maneu-
verable interspecific fighting groups.
 ¡ Annihilation of the enemy’s military and eco-
nomic power by short-time precise strikes in 
strategic military and civilian infrastructure.
 ¡ Massive use of high-precision weapons and 
special operations, robotics, and weapons that 
use new physical principles (direct-energy 
weapons—lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.).
 ¡ Use of armed civilians (4 civilians to 1 
military).
 ¡ Simultaneous strike on the enemy’s units and 
facilities in all of the territory.
 ¡ Simultaneous battle on land, air, and sea in the 
informational space.
 ¡ Use of asymmetric and indirect methods.
 ¡ Management of troops in a unified informa-
tional sphere.










action, those nations that border Russia must develop a strategy that ensures their 
sovereignty even without the alliance’s help.  
To do this, these nations’ leaders must change their way of thinking about defense 
and reconsider the methods they use to fight wars. They should understand that 
“traditional military hardware—tanks, armored cars, high performance aircraft, 
and warships—would become largely peripheral and increasingly irrelevant. 
Conventional measures of military capability—manpower, firepower, etc.—also 
fall by the wayside.” 17 There is no longer any distinction between what is and is 
not a battlefield. Physical spaces, including the ground, the sea, the air, and outer 
space, are all potential battlefields, but social spaces such as political, economic, 
and cultural spheres; cyberspace; and even the psyche are also at risk. Based on this 
new reality, Eastern European countries’ conventionally organized, hierarchical, 
and doctrinally rigid militaries are not capable of facing the multi-faceted threats of 
this new form of warfare. They need to develop unfamiliar characteristics such as 
proactivity, flexibility, and adaptation.18 
Eastern European countries are spending large amounts of money on defense 
budgets to maintain weapons systems that are obsolete even for a conventional 
war—such systems have become completely irrelevant in this new operational 
environment. Military hardware such as T-72 tanks, BTR-80 and BRDM-2 
armored personnel carriers, MI-8 helicopters, and so on are more than 30 
years old, and cannot support modern communications equipment and night 
vision capabilities or protect from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
attack. The ever-growing difficulty of getting spare parts to keep these weapons 
serviceable further reduces their utility and exposes the countries that depend 
on them to possible Russian influence. At the same time, Eastern European 
countries are trying to mitigate the security risk posed by these older systems 
by acquiring newly developed high-tech weapons from wealthy allies such as 
the United States. The price tag of such systems, however, is extremely high. 
Some major items, such as fighter jets and transport aircraft, can cost US$100 
million apiece or more, not counting maintenance, training, and operational 
deployment costs. Paying for such hardware is an obstacle even for the bigger, 
wealthier countries, while for small countries it is clearly impossible. Although 
these smaller countries may manage to buy some quality hardware now and again, 
they cannot afford a whole, cohesive, interoperable system.19 Even if they could 
afford it, they would be missing the point. It is obvious that these countries are still 
trapped in the idea of fighting the fight that fits their existing organization and 
weapons and are unable or unwilling to implement fundamental changes to catch 
up with the realities of the twenty-first century.
If there has ever been a time in history when military strategist Frank Hoffman’s 
statement that “the incentives for states to exploit non-traditional modes of war 
are on the rise” 20 was true, then today is that time. As retired Lieutenant General 
David Barno, US Army, described the problem,
Our military today is in a sense operating without a concept of war and 
is searching desperately for the new “unified field theory” of conflict 
that will serve to organize and drive military doctrine and tactics, 
acquisition and research, training and organization, leader development 
and education, materiel and weaponry, and personnel and promotion 
policies in ways that could replace the legacy impact that Cold War 
structures still exert on all facets of the military. Today, no agreed-upon 
theory of conflict drives all of these critical vectors toward a commonly 
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understood paradigm; the result is a profusion of disparate outlooks 
leading toward the risk of professional incoherence.21
Many contemporary researchers have concluded that unconventional tactics, 
techniques, procedures, and protracted ways of warfare belong to the “weak” side 
of conflicts, most frequently to non-state actors, that is, groups that do not have 
any other means to fight their adversaries. But we should not allow ourselves to 
be limited by such thinking. The Eastern European countries must ask whether 
they can develop a comprehensive, nontraditional security strategy that will 
enable them to face either a conventional or a hybrid threat, with or without the 
support of NATO. These nations must abandon the idea of fighting the fight that 
fits their weapons; they must first choose how they will fight and then build the 
weapons they need for that fight. To implement such a concept, it is imperative to 
reverse the process by which a revolution in weapons technology precedes a cor-
responding revolution in military affairs. Eastern European states should modify 
the fundamentals of their defense structure to be able to meet future challenges. 
First, it is paramount that these countries redesign their approach to security 
decision making by subordinating all national security–related decision making 
to a single coordinating body. This does not necessarily mean the actual merging 
of individual organizations, but rather, as described by national security expert 
Janis Berzins, “the coordination of all national bodies of executive power to the 
Ministry of Defence and the National Armed Forces’ General Staff in matters 
of defence and national security.” 22 Second, these states should realign all of 
their conventional military units into irregular formations, according to John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s “swarming” theory.23 This restructuring has to 
be supported by a new kind of conscript system: a combination of the Swiss 
and Israeli models that expects all capable citizens to help defend their country 
when needed as members of the irregular units. Third, unit commanders must 
have sufficient autonomy to decide when and how to respond to an attack 
without a formal presidential or parliamentary authorization. It is also impera-
tive to require each citizen to resist the aggressor, including by military defense, 
guerrilla warfare, civil disobedience, noncollaboration, and other means. Fourth, 
the countries have to prepare their infrastructure to best support the new way of 
warfare, similar to the way Hezbollah prepared its positions prior to the Second 
Lebanon War.24 
The fifth and most important step of this concept is to operationalize all other 
instruments of national power, including the “weaponization” of the media to 
support the proposed approach. Some people may find that several elements of 
this plan go against national traditions and democratic norms, and could imply 
putting the entire world on a total war footing. No doubt they are right. Those 
nations that are facing the new form of Russian aggression on their borders, 
however, might be quite willing to consider concepts that could ensure their 
national survival. For Eastern European countries, the time for “thinking outside 
of the box” should be over, and the time for “thinking without the box” must 
begin. Eastern European countries should exploit hybrid warfare for their own 
benefit, so that it can become the way of the smart and nimble instead of the 
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Report on the 2014 Special Operations 
Research Association Symposium
Patricia Blocksome, Dr. Christopher 
Marsh, and Dr. Robert Tomlin-
son, Special Operations Research 
Association
On 24–25 October 2014, the Special Operations Research Asso-
ciation (SORA) sponsored an inaugural academic symposium at Ft. Leavenworth, 
Kansas, which focused on special operations and related topics. The SORA 
symposium brought together approximately 40 attendees from a number of 
countries, who represented the spectrum of the community of interest, including 
academics, military and interagency practitioners, and policy analysts. For two 
days, symposium attendees participated in discussions on the current state of the 
special operations research field, as well as opportunities for future study.
Founded in 2013, SORA is a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting 
research across academia, the military, and the SOF community on the nature, 
conduct, and sources of success of special operations. SORA is the home of the 
peer-reviewed Special Operations Journal, published in collaboration with the 
academic press Routledge–Taylor & Francis.1
SORA’s mission is to promote research in special operations and SOF to more 
fully comprehend their nature and utility, and the factors contributing to 
mission success; to better understand both how special operations are planned 
and conducted and the part special operations play in the policy making process; 
and to enhance appreciation of the unique role of special operations and SOF in 
national strategy. In line with this mission, SORA not only publishes the Special 
Operations Journal but also collaborates with government and nongovernment 
entities on related topics. It further seeks to develop a community of researchers, 
planners, and practitioners who share insights and thinking on special opera-
tions, and will engage in funded research on topics of particular importance. 
SORA’s purpose in organizing an annual symposium was, therefore, not only 
to promote research on all aspects of special operations but also to further 
strengthen the nascent special operations research community.
The overall theme for the 2014 symposium was “Special Operations and Stra-
tegic Implications,” which participants addressed from a variety of perspectives. 
The symposium’s keynote speaker, RAND senior policy analyst Linda Robinson, 
gave a speech entitled “The Future of Special Operations: Enhancing the Stra-
tegic Impact of SOF.” 2 This speech was based on her study of the topic of special 
warfare as a strategic and operational approach by which the United States 
can exert influence in the “missing middle”: that potential area of operations 
between the costly and indefinite commitment of conventional forces and the 
limitations posed by distant-strike options, such as drones and cruise missiles.3 
The talk was extremely well received by the more than 100 conference attendees, 
including staff and faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College 
and its large SOF contingent.
During the symposium, panelists presented papers discussing their current 











multiple presentations, were organized thematically to 
provide diverse perspectives on a common topic. The 
panels on “Future Issues Facing SOF” and “The Utility of 
SOF Power” addressed the ways that special operations can 
provide options for diplomacy, partnership, and national 
security initiatives. They also identified cultural and insti-
tutional limitations on the uses of special operations and 
noted that these limitations can vary by country and over 
time, although the reasons for these variations are under-
studied. These panels emphasized how recent changes in 
US SOF force structure may be influencing both the options 
and limitations of US SOF deployment.
The “Winning Special Warfare,” “Unconventional Ap-
proaches to Contemporary Challenges for SOF,” and 
“Case Studies in Special Operations” panels all addressed 
the ways in which special operations and special warfare 
models provide insight into and compare with actual mili-
tary campaigns and guerrilla strate-
gies. As panelists pointed out, there 
are a number of abstract models that 
have real-world implications. These 
mental frameworks vary by case and 
shape the way that participants act. 
Panelists noted the need for further 
analysis and refinement of special 
operations models, with particular 
attention paid to how these models 
influence planning for and responses 
to special operations campaigns.
A very interesting—and timely—panel, “Special Opera-
tions and Russia,” was devoted to the situation in Ukraine 
and Russian unconventional warfare. Major Antonius 
Selhorst, Netherlands Army, presented his research on the 
evolution of Russia’s “new generation” warfare, based on 
his analysis of Russia’s post-Soviet conflicts with Moldova, 
Estonia, Georgia, and now Ukraine. MAJ Selhorst persua-
sively argued that this new model of warfare has evolved 
slowly over the past two decades, and that lessons learned 
in the earlier conflicts influenced significant modifica-
tions to it. These modifications are now appearing in the 
Ukraine conflict.
The panel that generated perhaps the most discussion and 
calls for further research was titled “Developing a Theory 
of SOF.” Participants on this panel debated the benefits 
and disadvantages of such a theory. Some participants, 
notably Dr. James Kiras of the US Air Force School of 
Advanced Air and Space Studies, argued very persuasively 
that no special theory of SOF or special operations is 
needed, and that the field of special operations research 
can continue—indeed, might more fruitfully develop—
without a set theory for guidance. As Dr. Kiras pointed 
out, in the spirit of physicist and philosopher Thomas 
Kuhn, paradigms do as much to constrain new research 
as they do to promote it.4 Colonel Jeff Goble of the Joint 
Special Operations University, however, argued equally 
persuasively that such a limiting structure is precisely what 
the nascent field of special operations research needs. 
Strategists thus far have failed to articulate any sort of 
coherent theory of what special operations are, leaving it 
to doctrine writers and those who designate military units 
to determine what is “special” and what is not. Members 
of the audience seemed to find value in both perspectives 
and agreed that this was an issue not likely to be settled 
anytime soon.
In addition to the panels, the symposium included two 
roundtables. The first was on “The Art and Design of the 
Special Operations Campaign.” 
Chaired by Dr. Kiras, the 
roundtable included Lieutenant 
Colonel Mike Kenny, US Army; 
Dr. Christopher Marsh; Patricia 
Blocksome; and keynote speaker 
Linda Robinson. Before a 
packed auditorium, this group 
debated the value and utility of 
SOF-specific campaign planning 
as opposed to planning all cam-
paigns the same way, whether 
special operations–focused or 
not. The presenters generally agreed that the art and design 
of the special operations campaign require a different 
conceptual model from those used for conventional 
campaigns, but whether this conceptual model actually 
required different planning tools, campaign support plans, 
and campaign plans was an issue that the panel widely 
disagreed on. There was, however, an implicit agreement 
that special operations campaigns can no longer be looked 
at as merely supporting efforts for conventional campaigns 
or phase zero “shaping operations.” This roundtable was 
notable for its broad audience participation, with valu-
able input coming from all those present, ranging from 
academic specialists to special operators with decades 
of experience. Again, this was an issue that the audience 
agreed would not be settled anytime soon, but the op-
portunity to share ideas and debate the topic’s merit was of 
great value in and of itself.
The second roundtable centered on the issue of the use of 
intelligence in special operations. The debate here included 
important concerns such as the different responsibilities 
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and duties of the various intelligence agencies. For in-
stance, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is charged 
with providing strategic intelligence for the US president 
and other policy makers. The requirement to accomplish 
this sometimes conflicts with the tactical or operational 
intelligence required by special operations teams. The 
major issue that seemed to come out of the discussion was 
the need for a proper understanding of the differences 
between the tasks assigned to the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) and those assigned to the CIA. The round-
table resulted in a very robust discussion among panelists 
and audience members, who ranged from CIA and DIA 
senior officers to special operators with experience (often 
frustrating experience) working with these and other agen-
cies in the intelligence community. 
Following the symposium, attendees were encouraged to 
fill out a survey of their experience. Respondents reported 
attending this conference for a number of reasons: to 
pursue research interests in the area of special operations 
studies, to receive feedback on their research, to engage 
with the research community, to learn more about SOF, to 
learn more about and interact with SORA, and for profes-
sional development. All respondents said that the confer-
ence had fulfilled their reasons for attending.
When asked what they saw as the best part of attending 
the SORA symposium, a majority of respondents listed the 
roundtables, which encouraged open discussion between 
subject matter experts and conference attendees. Several 
noted that it is not often that a senior noncommissioned 
officer or junior field grade officer has the chance to engage 
in a theoretical discussion with such established subject 
matter experts as were present at the meeting. Addition-
ally, some of the attendees who came from a more purely 
academic environment, and thus had less interaction 
with the special operations community, found it equally 
valuable to engage with present and past special operators 
on their topics of research. Other highlights of the 
symposium included informal conversations, networking, 
and engagement opportunities. Several respondents 
noted that the community-building that went on at the 
symposium was invaluable, and they urged that more time 
be dedicated to this aspect at future symposia. The broad 
variety of panels and topics presented at the conference 
also garnered favorable remarks.
Based on the responses from the survey, as well as those 
from conversations with symposium attendees, the 
conference organizers were able to develop a working list 
of topics for future gatherings. These topics encompass 
the span of special operations research, ranging from 
the historical, to the tactical, to contemporary issues of 
global concern: SOF theory; SOF as an element of foreign 
policy; special operations history, including multinational 
perspectives on SOF strategy, doctrine, and force devel-
opment; coordinating special operations and enabling 
activities across joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 
multinational organizations; and contemporary challenges 
in the deployment of SOF. Planning for the 2015 SORA 
Symposium is already underway. The meeting will tenta-
tively be hosted in the fall at Hurlburt Field, Florida, home 
of the US Air Force Special Operations Command. v
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Dr. Michael Noonan, Foreign Policy  
Research Institute
Interviewed by Dr. Doug Borer,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating Terrorism Archive 
Project (CTAP).1 On 22 January 2015, Dr. Doug Borer sat down with Dr. Michael 
Noonan of the Foreign Policy Research Institute to talk about Noonan’s experi-
ences as a member of a military transition team in Iraq’s Tal Afar district and his 
career as a scholar in the field of counterterrorism.2 
DOUG BORER: Mike, please begin by telling us about your military service in Iraq.
MICHAEL NOONAN: I received a reserve commission through ROTC3 and 
graduated from the University of Scranton in 1993. While I was in graduate 
school at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska, I served with 1st Squadron, 
322nd Cavalry Regiment, 5th Cavalry Training Brigade. When I completed my 
coursework and my exams, I moved to Philadelphia and worked at the Foreign 
Policy Research Institute (FPRI) from 1995 to 1997, while continuing to serve 
with other reserve units. In 1997 I went back to graduate school, then started my 
coursework toward a doctorate in political science from Loyola University in 
Chicago. In 2000, after I finished my coursework, I returned to Philadelphia and 
FPRI. I went into the individual ready reserve and then found another training 
unit in Philadelphia.  
That was the unit I was in when I was mobilized in 2006. I was sitting at my desk 
working when I received a phone call from our operations noncommissioned 
officer (NCO) telling me that I had been mobilized and had a week to report to 
Fort Hood. I was assigned to a Military Transition Team (MiTT) and trained at 
North Fort Hood from May until late June 2006. We were among the last teams 
that went through this kind of training at Fort Hood before the program was 
moved to Fort Riley, Kansas. Most of the training focused on individual-level 
skills, communications, weapons, and other such things. At the time, there was 
very scant training for those who had advisory duties. Our team was set up a 
little bit differently from most. There were four majors, and I and another guy 
were assigned as the two captains on the team. The teams were mostly a hybrid 
of reservists and active duty soldiers, but some other teams had National Guard 
members. We had three active duty soldiers on the team: a fire support officer, a 
forward observer NCO [13F military occupational specialty], and our medic.  
At the end of June, we deployed to Kuwait, where we did about two weeks of 
training, getting acclimatized to the desert, zeroing our rifles, that sort of thing. 
We were then in Baghdad for a day or two before going to the Phoenix Academy 
in Taji, which is a kind of counterinsurgency school. There we familiarized 
ourselves with the electronic warfare systems that we would use for our vehicles 
and some of the communications gear, and learned more about Iraqi culture 
and how the Iraqi Army was set up. From there we deployed up to Tal Afar. 
We were working with 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 3rd Iraqi Army Division, and 
our unit was located about six kilometers [five miles] outside of Tal Afar at a 
place called Fort Tal Afar, along the Mosul-Sinjar Highway—Route Santa Fe 
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A Black Hawk flies over the Iraqi desert as it 
returns from a mission on Forward Operating 
Base Sykes in northern Iraq, 2009.
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in American military parlance. Our battalion’s area of operation reached from 
the northeastern section of the city up toward the Syrian border and then down 
along the oil pipeline road. Ours was the third team that had been embedded 
with the battalion. This was about a year after the Battle of Tal Afar, when the 
3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and other units went and cleared out insurgents 
from the city.
Tal Afar sits in a saddle between two ridgelines of what’s called the Sheikh 
Ibrahim mountain range. The city itself, which has a large Ottoman castle 
in the center, was a waypoint on an historic trade route that ran through the 
region. That part of the country is a very interesting ethnic region. It’s largely 
a mix of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen—ethnic Turks, both Sunni and Shi’a. 
[Former Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein had relocated a large number of 
former soldiers of Turkmen background along the Mosul-Sinjar Highway in 
the northern part of the city to help bolster his control over that key line of 
communication from Mosul to Sinjar. We had heard that in the late 1980s and 
1990s there started to be more Salafist-inspired Sunni influence there, and it 
was part of Saddam’s plan to use Islam as a way to help bolster his regime.4 
The battalion we worked with was an infantry battalion in the Iraqi Army. 
About a third of it was ethnic Kurds, many of whom had been seconded from 
the peshmerga.5 Up in the north, all of the division and brigade commanders 
were Kurds, and most, although not all, of the battalion commanders were 
Kurdish officers as well. The battalion commander whom we worked with was 
a Kurdish officer, who has since left the Iraqi Army and is now back with the 
peshmerga. A very bold and effective commander, he would use a large propor-
tion of the battalion to go out on operations, everyone down to clerks and cooks. 
If they needed combat power, he would basically send everybody out.  
Our mission was several-fold. Our primary mission was to help the Iraqi bat-
talion improve its staff operations. Other transition teams had already worked 
on the basic rifle marksmanship and those kinds of things, so we were trying to 
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help the Iraqis with operations, logistics, personnel matters, and intelligence. I 
was the headquarters services company advisor, but a lot of my work was also 
dealing with personnel issues such as pay, promotions, and so on. I had no 
previous experience working in these areas, so not only did I have to self-teach 
myself about the Iraqis’ personnel issues, but I also had to deal with personnel 
issues for the team itself—pay, promotions, awards, and such things. The team 
also went out as a coalition liaison element when the Iraqis were conducting 
operations that were larger than company-sized, or we would go out on opera-
tions with the battalion commander to provide close air support or medical 
evacuation if needed.  
The battalion itself was fairly active in the area. The team that we replaced had 
taken some casualties during the Battle of Tal Afar, and so they hadn’t gone out 
with the battalion in a while. When we showed up there, we had a lot of work 
to do, and our team chief decided that we would go out a lot with the Iraqis to 
see what they were doing. We also would do things for the coalition units in 
the area. If there were suspected IEDs, we would go out, and if we confirmed 
that there were devices out there, we’d call back for explosive ordnance disposal 
support. There were other coalition units with us when we first got there, but 
eventually they went away. We were alone with the Iraqi battalion for a period 
of about six months before the battalion moved up to the Al Kisik Military Base 
(AKMB), about 20 kilometers away from our location.  
BORER: Did you move with it?
NOONAN: We eventually moved up to AKMB, but that was at the very end of 
our tour, in late May or early June 2007, before we redeployed back to the United 
States. Our replacements came in at that time, and we worked with them, telling 
them about the peculiarities of the Iraqi battalion. The Iraqi battalion system 
is kind of interesting because a quarter of the battalion may be on leave at any 
time. The battalion was 30 percent Kurds, about 20 percent Sunni Arabs, with 
some Yezidis and other groups also mixed in, and about half of the battalion 
were Shi’a from the south. So personnel going home on leave would be gone 
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about a week, because it would take them a couple of days to get down south, 
especially if they were from Basra. This caused another problem, because the 
battalion commander would be gone for a week to 10 days every month as well, 
and while he was a very good and effective officer, his XO [executive officer], 
who took command in his absence, was not. The XO was a Shi’a officer from 
Diyala Province, who was politically very well connected in the Iraqi Ministry of 
Defense. He had the worst combination of characteristics: a coward in the field 
and a bully in garrison. He was very old school. He believed in the practices of 
the former Iraqi Army [before the 2003 invasion], and we had a lot of issues with 
him. We reported up the MiTT chain of command all of the time about how he 
was not really fit to be a commander, but nothing changed. 
BORER: Can you give an example? For instance, did you witness routine corrup-
tion? When you say he was a bully, was there a clear profit motive for him?  
NOONAN: The XO would use the euphemism “to use power” on someone, which 
meant that he was going to beat up a person. We stopped him a few times 
when we found out that he was abusing prisoners, but he would just wait until 
he thought we weren’t around to do his bullying. For another example, the 
Iraqi power grid was very spotty, so we would have maybe one or two hours of 
electricity a day, but there was also a diesel generator available. Our team had 
our own little generators to keep our tactical operations center (TOC) going, so 
our radios and other equipment would work when the power went down, but 
we didn’t have lights or anything extra. This officer had it set up so that his sec-
tion of the officers’ quarters always had power no matter what time of day it was. 
It got very cold up there in the north, but his section was all lit up no matter 
what the conditions were, while the rest of the battalion was in the dark and in 
the cold. Some of the local Iraqis jokingly referred to this section as “the Green 
Zone”—a reference to the walled-off American-controlled district in Baghdad.
BORER: Earlier you mentioned your on-the-job training. Did you think that 
situation put you at a disadvantage, or were you and your fellow team members 
able to quickly figure out what you needed to do? Did you always have a sense of 
“We’re not really sure what we’re doing”?
NOONAN: I think it depended a lot on the individuals. I tried to help out as 
much as I could, and I think we made some progress on some things, but I think 
a lot of it depended on each person’s level of comfort dealing with the Iraqis. 
There were certainly people on my team who weren’t very comfortable working 
with the Iraqis and probably did the bare minimum job. I just happened to 
have a good relationship with my counterpart and with the other people in the 
personnel section, so that is where I focused a lot of my time. The medic and 
some of the other communications guys worked with the headquarters services 
company elements, which were about a seven-platoon structure. Our medic 
worked with the Iraqi medical platoon a lot. We also had a Navy corpsman with 
us. Because the battalion didn’t have a surgeon or a nurse or a doctor to work 
with him, he would prescribe medication and deal with medical issues. So yes, I 
think it was a very individual reaction. 
BORER: What happened when you left Iraq and demobilized? You were an 
individual augmentee, so were you just shipped back to your regular life? Was it 
as if your time in Iraq was nothing more than an interesting experience? Or were 
you able to pass your knowledge along to another reserve unit back in the States?
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NOONAN: My cohort were the last reservists who went through North Fort 
Hood for predeployment training. The Army changed to a different system after 
that, using mainly active duty personnel. So the people who replaced us were 
active duty personnel who were either asked to serve on a MiTT or were “volun-
told” to report for that duty. There was no real screening for this type of duty. 
It all came down to fit of personality and willingness to work with Iraqis. I have 
taken some umbrage over the years with people who criticized the reservists and 
others who were sent to Iraq. It’s not like we had a choice in the matter. I think 
most of us tried to do the best we could in the situation—our team, for example, 
lived with our Iraqi counterparts the whole time. Particularly when active duty 
officers would say, “Well, you weren’t the right guys for the job,” it felt like a slap 
in the face, because there were always opportunities for those officers to volun-
teer to serve on a transition team and they chose not to do so. The MiTT was 
seen as a dead-end posting for the average career-competitive active duty officer. 
BORER: When you say that you lived with the Iraqis, do you mean that you were 
in the same housing and shared the same chow [meal] lines? You mean you were 
always reliant on the Iraqis and they relied on you, in an integrated fashion?
NOONAN: Yes, we lived in the same fort. When the last coalition unit left our 
location, the squadron commander in the area had some workers put up a few 
steel gates to provide extra security for the long L-shaped corridor where we 
lived. We would keep the gates open during the day, but at night we would lock 
up, as an added force protection measure. The Iraqi Army is a strange duck, 
because it has a very heavy British influence, but it also has these peculiar Soviet 
traditions. For instance, much like in the British Army, there is a big social 
distance between officers and enlisted personnel, but the battalion allowed our 
NCOs to eat in the Iraqi officers’ chow hall. We would go down there to get, if 
nothing else, some cucumber, tomato, and onion salad and some chicken. We 
always joked, “What was for dinner tonight?” because it was either rice and 
chicken or chicken and rice, but it was good, and better than eating MREs6 or 
other packaged things. I think the fact that we didn’t hold ourselves above our 
Iraqi counterparts and ate meals with them helped build rapport as well. During 
Ramadan, we would sometimes share Iftar [the evening meal] with them, or if 
there was a holiday or similar thing we would share a big celebration dinner with 
the Iraqis.  
BORER: Have you been able to or had an interest in maintaining a connec-
tion with any of the people you served with, either Americans from the South 
Carolina unit or any Iraqis?
NOONAN: Yes, I have kept in touch with some guys who were on the team 
and also with my Iraqi counterparts, particularly on Facebook. It was a very 
depressing period for me last summer, when I was seeing the places where I had 
been on the news. This was during the big ISIS offensive up in Nineveh and other 
places. ISIS is basically a direct outgrowth of al Qaeda in Iraq, and there were 
some Iraqis who perpetrated some terrible, terrible events when we were there. 
There was a big bombing in the southern market of Tal Afar in March 2007 that 
indiscriminately killed more than 120 people just because they were Shi’a and 
therefore, apostates to al Qaeda in Iraq. So it was disheartening to see that these 
militants were on the march there. I have kept in touch with my counterpart, 
who is still in the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish former battalion commander who 
rejoined the peshmerga. He was active in helping recapture the Mosul dam from 
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ISIS. And I have kept in touch with our interpreters. One 
of them has immigrated to the United States, and I have 
been able to keep in touch through Facebook with another 
guy who was my favorite interpreter and is still in Iraq.
BORER: Do you have any understanding of the reasons for 
the collapse of the Iraqi forces in the face of ISIS? When 
I hear that Americans are going back to train and equip 
Iraqis today, I wonder whether the secret of their collapse 
is that they had poor training and equipment, or was it 
because of corruption. Did your connections give you any 
explanation?
NOONAN: I think one of the big problems that arose 
after coalition forces left Iraq is that Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki tried to “coup-proof ” himself by asserting the 
dominance of the Shi’a narrative in Iraq. Unlike in the 
north, where for political reasons there were a lot of sec-
onded peshmerga officers in command positions, Maliki 
put politically connected or politically safe commanders 
in charge of the Iraqi Army units. When you look at the 
correlation of forces between Iraqi and ISIS numbers up in 
the north, the Iraqi Army should have been able to stand 
on its own against ISIS. The Iraqi forces had numerical 
superiority. But too many of these officers were chosen for 
their political acumen or connections rather than their 
tactical abilities. So when push came to shove, and the 
Iraqi security forces saw these 1,000 fanatics in pickup 
trucks and armored vehicles coming at them, they decided 
to leave. If you are a jundi [enlisted soldier] from Basra and 
you see your commanders leaving, there is not really a lot 
of incentive for you to stick around and hold the ground.
In a couple of cases, Iraqi soldiers tried to put on civilian 
clothes and quietly exfiltrate, but the ISIS fighters found 
and killed them, purely on the grounds that the Iraqi forces 
were apostate Shi’a and therefore weren’t really Muslims. 
This led to a kind of rolling collapse throughout the 
country, and then the Kurds decided that they were going 
to take Kirkuk, which had long been an objective of theirs.7 
If Iraq were to dissolve as a viable political entity, then the 
Kurds want Kirkuk’s oil to sustain their own economic 
future. We can hope that the new Iraqi government is 
taking a longer view with regard to how it treats its Sunni 
and Kurdish citizens, but it’s still a very messy situation. 
Obviously, the United States is trying to help out as much 
as it can in Iraq, but the Iranians are also on the ground 
there and have their own interests and considerations with 
regard to Iraq. Unfortunately, I think the outcome is going 
to depend on what modus vivendi can be struck to satisfy 
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as many interests as possible and try to keep the country 
together. Or everyone may just decide at a certain point 
that Iraq is going to fall apart.  
BORER: Do you think that the Iranian influence in Iraq 
may actually be in parallel with American interests? Or, do 
you think that they are another issue of contention?
NOONAN: I think that sometimes interests will align and 
sometimes they will be contentious. One way to look at 
the situation is to say that the Iranians gained great influ-
ence in Iraq after coalition forces left and Maliki basically 
handed the keys over to the Iranians. There are reports, for 
instance, that Qasem Suleimani, the Quds Force com-
mander, was able to get a lot of money through the Iraqi 
government for his international activities, such as support 
for the Assad regime in Syria, or Hezbollah and Hamas.8 
At the same time, because the Iranians were so involved 
in Iraq, they share responsibility for the problem with 
ISIS. So, on the one hand I think Iran’s involvement hurt 
our interests in Iraq, but on the other hand it burdens the 
Iranians with being responsible for the outcome. 
I think Iran and the United States definitely have an 
alignment of interests concerning the dangers of ISIS—it’s 
just a matter of what can be made from that, and whether 
the two sides can strike some kind of modus vivendi or 
whether things continue to get worse. The whole situation 
in Syria and Iraq could create further regional instability. 
There have already been some incidents along the Saudi 
border, and if the contagion of ISIS and the radical takfiri 
view spreads, then things could get a lot worse very rapidly, 
especially in places like Bahrain and in the eastern oilfield 
region where a lot of Shi’a Arabs live. There could be some 
real problems in the future. 
BORER: Mike, I would like to take you back now, to when 




NOONAN: When our replacements arrived, I was able to train up my replace-
ment early on, and then I went to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Sykes on the 
western outskirts of Tal Afar. I stayed there for about five days, which allowed 
me a little bit of time to decompress. There wasn’t much at FOB Sykes, but it 
also was not a place like Mosul, where there were a lot of indirect fire attacks. 
On one of the scarier days I spent in Iraq, I was in Mosul when part of FOB 
Diamondback, which was the airfield in Mosul, was hit by 26 82 mm mortar 
rounds within about a 20-minute timespan. FOB Sykes never really took indirect 
fire, so going there gave us a little bit of time to relax. After that we went to 
Kuwait for a couple of days, and then we went back to Fort Hood. But when 
we got to Fort Hood, our demobilization became a very rushed process. I think 
we reached Fort Hood on a Tuesday afternoon, and the people there told us we 
had to get out and go home by Friday. They also told us that we were still under 
General Order Number 1, so we weren’t supposed to drink alcohol. I think a 
lot of that was just “CYA” on the part of the people who were administering the 
demobilization station there.
BORER: What’s CYA?
NOONAN: “Cover your ass.”  
BORER: Okay. 
NOONAN: We were at Fort Hood for a few days, and then on Friday we were 
told, basically, “Here is your plane ticket, get out.” So I went from being in 
a war zone 10 days or even less prior to being back home. I had about three 
weeks of accrued leave. My wife was working at an immigration law firm at the 
time, and it was a very busy season so she couldn’t take time off. When I first 
got back, however, my employer gave me another two weeks of paid vacation, 
thank goodness. Although I didn’t see a lot of action in Iraq, I did see some, so it 
took some time to get used to doing simple things like driving without worrying 
about litter on the street, without scanning for IEDs. I lived in South Philadel-
phia at the time, which was a very built-up area, so it took a while for me to shut 
off the impulse to scan every rooftop when I was walking down the street, or 
react to loud noises and other things. My wife would go to work, and I would 
just kind of chill out during the day until she came home. It was good in that 
sense to have time alone—me and my cats just hanging out, watching baseball 
and drinking beer.
In the fall of 2007, after going back to work at FPRI, I wrote a piece in the 
journal The American Interest called “The Business We’ve Chosen.” 9 The title is 
a famous line from the movie The Godfather: Part II, in which the characters 
Hyman Roth and Michael Corleone are talking about some people who had 
been killed.10 Roth tells Corleone, “This is the business we’ve chosen.” Don’t 
take things too personally, it’s just business. 
The hard part for me wasn’t that the business I had chosen was to go to Iraq; the 
hard part was that the business I had chosen for my career was to work at a think 
tank. So when I came back to work, I felt as though I were in a fishbowl: every-
body was constantly asking me, “What’s happening in Iraq, what’s going on 
there?” The battalion I was tactically embedded with operated in a pretty small 
battlespace in terms of the overall war, and we tended to look at things “through 
a soda straw”: we were seeing only what was happening in our own area. I didn’t 
have enough information at the time to “zoom out” and see the bigger picture of 
the war. The article “The Business We’ve Chosen” was really about me and about 
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what it was like to work at a think tank, where it is our job 
to focus on such events, while I was still coming to grips 
with what I had just experienced.  
The questions from my colleagues led me to think about 
advisory missions and working with host-nation partners 
and indigenous forces. I had taken a couple of years’ leave 
of absence from my doctoral program and was working on 
a dissertation on US civil-military relations and the use of 
force at a macro level—the high-end decisions about the 
use of force that are made by military and political officials. 
When I came back from Iraq, I decided that first, all of the 
low-hanging fruit on that topic had been picked by that 
time, and second, the topic just didn’t really interest me 
anymore. Although I obviously did not receive anything 
like the level of training or in-
struction that people in the SOF 
community receive, my experience 
serving on an advisory team had 
me thinking about how to work 
with host-nation governments on 
their own particular security issues. 
So I started to research US experi-
ences in places like El Salvador, 
and in Operation Enduring 
Freedom–Philippines and Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara. I was thinking 
about the best ways to deal with a country’s security 
problems—not at the Iraq level where you are talking about 
sending in 140,000 troops, but on a much smaller scale. A 
lot of my thinking about the use of smaller scale advisory 
missions was based on the geostrategic environment at the 
time [2007 and 2008]. Events of the past few years have 
convinced me that the use of such advisory missions will 
certainly be an issue for the foreseeable future, especially 
when I think about the transnational foreign fighters from 
the West and elsewhere who are going into the Iraq-Syria 
region, or myriad other security concerns. 
We held a conference at FPRI a few years ago at which a 
military historian, Robert Mackey, talked about the post–
Civil War era in the United States, and about Confederate 
guerillas who couldn’t return home again after the war 
because they were too psychologically damaged to func-
tion in peacetime civil society. A lot of these exiled former 
soldiers, like Cole Younger, turned into outlaws in the 
Wild West.11 I think this is what we are seeing now, with 
this third flow of foreign fighters. This problem goes 
back to the Afghan-Soviet war (1978–1989), when the 
veterans of that conflict went to places like Algeria, Egypt, 
Chechnya, Dagestan, and the former Yugoslavia and 
started militant groups such as Algeria’s Salafist Group for 
Preaching and Combat.12 Wars and insurgencies produced 
these veterans, who then went and asserted themselves in 
these other places and mostly made things worse. The Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars that began after 9/11 drew these 
veterans in, and now the foreign fighters in Syria are a 
much bigger problem than we have ever seen before. 
No matter how any given conflict turns out, once the fight-
ing’s over, there will be veterans who go to other places 
and take advantage of security problems there, whether 
it be in nations in the original conflict region or back in 
the United States and Canada, or in Western Europe. We 
have seen this with the attack on Charlie Hebdo and the 
kosher supermarket in Paris and the killings at the Jewish 
Museum in Brussels.13 Now we are also seeing a reassertion 
of great power politics in places like Ukraine, where Russia 
was able to foster subversion in 
historically orthodox and pro-
Russian sections of the country. 
The United States has enduring 
interests with regard to China as 
well, but Washington is in a period 
of budget sequestration and is 
finishing up two big wars that 
cost a lot of money. So there are 
debates within American politics 
about what role the United States 
should play in the world. The solution to US foreign policy 
problems is not always going to be 140,000 troops—some-
times it is going to be something much smaller. 
All of these issues came together for me as I looked at 
things like civil-military relations, especially in an irregular 
warfare environment where military objectives aren’t 
necessarily in the lead but usually play a supporting role 
to the political, social, and economic issues that are the 
primary tactical considerations on the ground in such 
conflicts. I think that the skills the US military hones in 
the special operations forces—particularly on the special 
warfare side in the Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and 
Psychological Operations, and some selected forces in the 
other services—and the need to work with and through 
host nation governments and security forces, are aspects of 
military operations that are going to be with us for a long 
time to come. My experiences working with host nation 
forces in Iraq got me interested in the whole topic of 
advisors and their role in the national security strategy of 
the United States. 
BORER: Right. We know that very few of our current 
decision makers, at least in the United States, have military 
service experience. From your understanding, do US leaders 
know about this resource: the advisory teams and special 






operators who can go into a country and essentially project US interests and power 
with a very, very small footprint? 
NOONAN: I think they have some knowledge about it, but I also worry about 
these big headline things like the Abbottabad raid and the Maersk Alabama 
takedown.14 US direct-action forces are the best in the world at what they do, but 
even though these kind of direct-action tactical engagements, such as the raid 
that got Osama bin Laden, might have strategic or operational impact, they are 
not always going to be the right tool to use. If politicians become too enamored 
with such a tool they may use it places where it causes more problems than 
it solves. We now have a big security problem in Yemen, where Houthi tribal 
fighters have taken over the presidential palace, and where there is also al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula. I think we focused too much on the direct-action portion of 
targeting and the use of drone strikes and such things. We spent our time mowing 
the lawn in Yemen, so to speak, rather than building up the gardening skills and 
the landscaping skills that would have allowed the host nation leaders to deal with 
these problems themselves. And then we take it upon ourselves to be a raiding 
force that goes in there. 
A former Department of Defense official talked the other day about how Yemen 
highlights a kind of poverty of thought in the US administration’s policy, which 
seems to rely on SOF and drone strikes as an antidote to some of these security 
issues. Drones and special operations might not have been the right tools 
to have on the ground there. The administration might have assumed that 
targeting and other kinetic actions were more valuable than building Yemen’s 
infrastructure and helping it to develop the indigenous capability to provide 
its own security. If the United States relied less on military force alone, it could 
then focus more on the other country’s social and economic needs, and build 
the host nation’s institutions and forces that might be better for dealing with 
the problems on the ground. What was always interesting about working with 
the Iraqis was how innovative and creative they could be with what, to us, were 
inferior materials. The result wouldn’t be up to our standards, but it was “Iraqi 
good enough.” Sometimes you need to accept suboptimal solutions because 
they are what the locals can sustain, something that works for them in their 
culture, and within their resource constraints. You don’t need a Ferrari all the 
time. A Kia or a Yugo might be just as effective for other people’s needs, even if it 
might not be as flashy or high-performance as what you can bring to the table.  
BORER: Mike, I would like to finish this interview with what I call the “king 
for the day” question. If you were king for the day and could make one or two 
instrumental, long-term structural changes to US forces, what would you do?
NOONAN: I would stand up a joint special warfare command that was coequal 
to Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and bring in a lot of rank horse-
power and resources. If people think about SOF having two parts, surgical strike 
and special warfare, I think that the current command, resourcing, and rank 
structures encourage a degree of structural imbalance that might lead some 
people to favor JSOC and a more direct-action approach. This is not always 
appropriate for the jobs at hand. I don’t mean to take anything away from those 
special operations guys—they are phenomenal at what they do. But at the same 
time, we need to think about special warfare and working with and through 
host-nation governments to deal with some of these security issues. 
Yemeni Shi’ite Houthi fighters  
pose in Amran.
Armed Yemeni men loyal to the Shiite 
Houthi movement shout slogans during 
a tribal gathering.
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Such a policy will, first of all, lead to less dependence on 
the United States and second, allow us to work with the 
host nation to achieve regional objectives so that US forces 
don’t have to be the guarantor of last resort or have to get 
involved in large overseas engagements. Such a joint special 
warfare command structure would enable the United 
States to work with other governments so that they could 
deal with their own security interests in their own region. 
I think that developing a command that was coequal to 
JSOC would be a way of developing future leaders at Spe-
cial Operations Command (SOCOM) and other places. As 
you know, Army Special Forces are the largest force pro-
vider in SOCOM, but there has never been a career Special 
Forces officer serving as the commander of SOCOM. Not to 
say that the position always has to have a career SF officer, 
but I think that this is a force structure problem that puts 
the special warfare–oriented SOF at a relative disadvantage 
to JSOC within the overall SOCOM system. 
BORER: Thank you very much, Mike.
NOONAN: You’re welcome. Thank you for having me. v
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See The Godfather: Part II (Paramount Pictures, 1974), 
Internet Movie Database, n.d.: http://www.imdb.com/title/
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Trout, “Cole Younger (1844–1916),” State Historical Society 
of Missouri, Historic Missourians: http://shs.umsystem.edu/
historicmissourians/name/y/younger/
12 The Algerian insurgent group the Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat is now known as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
13 For information on the January 2015 attack on the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo, see coverage by the Guardian: http://
www.theguardian.com/world/charlie-hebdo-attack ; for more on 
the attack in Brussels, see “3 Dead in Shooting at Brussels Jewish 
Museum,” Times of Israel, 24 May 2014: http://www.timesofisrael.
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14 The Abbottabad raid refers to the covert SOF mission in 2011 that 
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Making Decisions, Taking Ethical 
Responsibility, Part 1: To Tool or Not to Tool
George Lober,  
US Naval Postgraduate School
I’m always amazed and a little disheartened when someone in a 
military or law enforcement organization whom I know and respect looks me in 
the eye and says, “I’m a tool,” and yet I hear that self-assessment often. If offered 
in public, the comment is typically followed by snickers from the listeners. That’s 
because in current American slang, the word “tool” refers to someone who is 
incapable of self-reflection—a factotum who possesses all the capacity for intel-
lectual self-analysis of a pair of pliers.  
I understand, however, that these members of the military or law enforcement who 
call themselves tools are not actually confessing that they’re dense as doorknobs. To 
the contrary, they’re saying something quite significant. They’re telling me that 
after self-reflection, they have come to see themselves simply as instruments—the 
“tools”—of a greater organization, and the means by which some directive or 
policy or strategy or law will be carried out. I suspect they’re also telling me that 
they see themselves as the tool through which society’s will is enacted.
The problem I have with such a self-perception is that it implies an abdication 
of individual ethical responsibility. It also demands the question, “If that’s the 
case, why should people who act as the tools of state power have to behave in 
an ethical way at all?” Put another way, if the primary role of such a tool is to 
obediently execute legal orders and intentions delivered from those higher in 
authority, why should that tool be bothered with the ethics of such orders? The 
obvious counters to that question, of course, are “What happens if the order 
results in something heinous? What if the law reflects the immoral will of a 
corrupt majority? What if … , what if … ?” While I agree that these are valid 
concerns, I believe that a much bigger question lies at their heart: should an 
individual who is personally charged with enforcing a law or following a legal 
order be held responsible for its unethical consequences? The answer, it strikes 
me, is complicated. 
Let me explain why.
In 1938, following the Austrian Anschluss, Paul Grüninger, a Swiss commander 
of state police in St. Gallen, near the border between Switzerland and Austria, 
made a decision. A recent Swiss law had mandated that border police forcibly 
turn back undocumented Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazi regime in Austria, 
despite the fact that they would likely face brutal detention and even death. 
When he was confronted, face-to-face, with the refugees’ pleas for compassion, 
Grüninger did what he thought anyone else would do under such circum-
stances.1 Rather than abide by the law, Grüninger chose to permit these refugees 
to remain in Switzerland. He even saw to it that they were issued illegally post-
dated visas to secure their stay.2 He later observed that, from his perspective, he 
had no choice but to fulfill his “human duty” to help them.3 For his deeply moral 
decision and subsequent actions, however, Grüninger lost both his position and 
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his retirement benefits, was fined hundreds of Swiss francs, struggled thereafter 
to support his family, was falsely accused of scandal, and remained socially 
ostracized for the rest of his life.4 This was all despite—or because of—the fact 
that he saved an estimated 3,600 lives.5
It’s easy to say that Paul Grüninger made the right decision, regardless of the 
consequences he later endured. He certainly believed he had. But at the time, the 
moral clarity of his choice wasn’t apparent to others, and frankly, I’m not so sure 
it would be today. Admittedly, there were powerful political and societal forces 
at play in Switzerland at the time: Bern was struggling to maintain its neutrality 
as war spread through Europe; anti-Jewish sentiment was on the rise across 
the continent; and there were fears that Germany, which had already annexed 
Austria earlier that year, would turn on Switzerland next. But one simple fact lay 
at the core of the backlash against Grüninger: a man charged with enforcing the 
law of the land took it upon himself to abandon that charge, ignore the law, and 
act according to his individual belief in what was right. At his sentencing, the 
court noted, “Such underhanded practices threaten the necessary trust and the 
respectability of authorities and the reliability of subordinates.” 6 As a captain of 
the police, Grüninger wasn’t expected to perform an ethical calculus and choose 
compassion; he was expected to obey the law and enforce it. For failing to do 
that, he was punished.
A second case from more recent history is similar, but also different. In April 
1994, as the Rwandan genocide began, hundreds of Tutsis terrified for their 
lives sought the shelter and protection of a Belgian UN force under the leader-
ship of Captain Luc Lemaire. The force, which was encamped at a local school, 
maintained its position during the first days of the killings, while Tutsis from 
the surrounding area sought the enclosed safety of the school grounds and the 
protection of Lemaire’s armed soldiers. By the end of the first week, the number 
of villagers seeking protection at the school had swelled to over 2,000, and 
Hutus armed with machetes began to circle the school in vehicles, taunting and 
threatening the people inside. It was then that Lemaire’s force received orders to 
pull back to the Kigali airport, because Belgium’s leaders had made the decision 
to evacuate all Belgian nationals, civilian and military, from Rwanda.7
When the Tutsis at the school learned 
of the soldiers’ imminent pullout, some 
begged Captain Lemaire and his men 
to shoot them. According to Lemaire, 
“They would rather be shot down by 
our machine gun than be murdered by 
machetes.” 8 Lemaire did not, however, 
order his men to mercy-kill the Tutsis. 
Instead, he and his force pulled out of 
the school in their vehicles, while firing 
a machine gun over the pleading crowd 
to clear a path. Almost immediately 
upon their departure, Hutu gangs 
entered the school grounds and slaugh-
tered the majority of the estimated 
2,500 men, women, and children who 
had sought the protection of Lemaire 








Two years later, in testimony before the International Criminal Trial for Rwanda, 
Lemaire cited the tactical situation on the ground, the lack of Belgian political 
will, and the inept United Nations bureaucracy for the fact that he “had no 
choice” but to abandon the Tutsis at the school.9 He repeated that assertion in an 
interview for a PBS Frontline episode, “Triumph of Evil.” In the episode, Lemaire 
was asked if he and his platoon had feared for their lives. “Certainly not,” he 
replied, “because as soldiers we have to be ready to die at any moment.” 10 The 
interviewer then asked what Lemaire could say to the family who had entrusted 
him to protect their young daughter, “only for you to abandon her.” 11 Lemaire 
reiterated, “I cannot say anything because it was so, and we had no choice.” 12  
The case of Captain Lemaire is now often taught in military ethics courses, 
and his decision to abandon the 2,500 Tutsis under his protection is frequently 
denounced by students, as is his contention that he “had no choice.” 
Taken together, the two cases, I believe, frame a debate. Both involve an indi-
vidual entrusted with a legal directive: in Grüninger’s case a law handed down 
by society, in Lemaire’s case a military order from higher up. Both instances 
involved the distinct likelihood that innocent lives would be lost if the directive 
were obeyed, and both men personally faced the pleas of individuals who might 
be killed. Both men had to make a choice, and in so doing, each believed that 
he “had no choice.” Grüninger and Lemaire were expected by their societies to 
serve as the instruments of political authority and to enact the will of democrati-
cally elected leaders, who presumably enjoyed a far broader perspective on the 
ramifications of their orders than the two officers. Each man made exactly the 
opposite choice of the other, and yet both were subsequently condemned for 
their choices. Why? 
One quick explanation for why the men chose differently may be that, at the mo-
ment when he had to decide the fate of others, Grüninger saw himself as human 
first and a tool of the state second, while Lemaire saw himself as an instrument 
of policy first and a human second. I think that’s probably a fair guess, but it’s 
probably also more than a bit facile. As to why they were condemned by their 
respective societies for their choices, again a quick explanation may be that both 
violated a prevailing ethos of their time. In Grüninger’s case, Swiss society was 
turned against Jewish refugees, while in Lemaire’s case, he violated a prevailing 
Western ethos that one does not knowingly abandon unarmed innocents to be 
hacked to death by mobs.  
Still, I think there are deeper layers of complexity to consider. If Paul Grüninger 
had, as the law required, returned the 3,600 Jewish refugees he encountered to 
Austria, would he have been excoriated, then or later, as having acted unethi-
cally? I doubt it. There had to have been many civil officials in Switzerland who, 
to a greater or lesser extent, did just that, but unlike Grüninger, the names of 
these obedient individuals have been all but forgotten. By contrast, if Lemaire 
had refused to abandon the 2,500 lives under his protection, how would we now 
view his decision? I want to believe that we would nobly hold him up as an ethical 
exemplar, but realistically, I suspect the answer would depend on subsequent 
events and their outcome. If, on the one hand, such a decision forced Belgium 
and the UN to commit more armed troops to Rwanda and somehow precipi-
tated a halt to the genocide, then I think his decision would be hailed as heroic. 
On the other hand, if he was simply relieved of command and his force pulled 
Genocide memorials at the École 
Technique Officielle.
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out anyway, or if the UN and Europe were dragged into an ongoing civil war in 
Africa because of him, I suspect the virtue of his decision would be lost in blame.
Who decides when individuals should respond as humans and when they should 
act as tools, and under what circumstances? Four years ago, Lieutenant Colonel 
Andrew Milburn attempted to answer those questions in an article entitled 
“Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional.” 13 Milburn wrote that 
when confronted with certain moral dilemmas, “a military officer is not only jus-
tified but obligated to disobey a legal order,” particularly when the ramifications 
of obedience to such an order would damage either the organization the officer 
serves or the nation as a whole. He nevertheless limited such an obligation to 
officers at “the strategic level of decision making.” 14 For his suggestion, Milburn 
was taken to task by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, whose printed riposte 
lumped Milburn into a cadre of “officers we should truly fear—those who skulk 
sullenly in corners with like-minded victims of alleged civilian malfeasance, 
drawing their wages while condemning the society that pays them.” 15 At his trial, 
Paul Grüninger no doubt heard something similar from the civilian lawmakers 
who were paying him. 
For my part, I’d prefer that when confronted with such profound moral dilemmas 
involving human life, those who serve and protect act first as humans and second 
as tools. In saying that, I’m reminded of the words of the Portuguese consul-gen-
eral Aristides de Sousa Mendes, who said, “If I am disobeying orders, I’d rather 
be with God against men than with men against God.” 16 That’s an easy thing to 
remember, but I bear in mind that it’s a much harder thing to do. v
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Rebels without Borders: Transnational 
Insurgencies in World Politics 
Reviewed by MAJ David Munyua,  
Uganda People’s Defence Force
IN 1979 MY 
FAMILY AND I 
FLED CIVIL WAR 
IN UGANDA.
As a young boy growing up in the conflict-prone region of 
East and Central Africa, in 1979 my family and I had to flee civil war in our 
country, Uganda, to seek refuge in the Sudan. We then had to flee back to 
Uganda in 1987 because of yet another civil war. Idean Salehyan’s book, Rebels 
without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics, which grew out of 
his doctoral dissertation, thus comes as a validation of my personal observation 
that most civil wars have at least some element of interstate conflict. Salehyan 
argues that civil wars and international disputes are not easily separable because 
they tend to be mutually reinforcing. This theory of transnational rebellion 
(TNR), as presented in Rebels without Borders, is a knowledgeable addition to 
the literature and enhances our understanding of both interactions between 
bordering states and the role of nonstate actors in these relations. For purposes 
of discussion, the book can be divided broadly into three parts.
The first part (Chapters 1, 2, and 3) systematically presents the theory of TNR.  
It begins with a critical review of the existing literature, which Salehyan tests and 
evaluates against his own extensive scholarship with the use of rich conflict data 
sets. The scientific paradigm that the author presents in this study is a valuable 
tool that he has used in previous work to augment knowledge in the disciplines 
of conflict studies, international relations, and political science. 
One of Salehyan’s primary arguments, which he supports with strong empirical 
evidence, is that when two unstable neighboring states are rivals, civil conflict is 
likely to develop in either state. This is because each rival state tends to provide 
sanctuary to insurgent groups that arise against the competitor’s government. 
States, on their own, are unlikely to risk deploying their military and political 
forces beyond their sovereign territory for fear of breaking international law and 
thus attracting unnecessary condemnation. Insurgencies can thus be tacitly en-
couraged by rival governments as proxies to destabilize their neighbor. Salehyan, 
therefore, proposes that the best way to deal with TNR is for the affected states to 
cooperate and eliminate the insurgents from their respective territories, or else to 
work together toward a political settlement of the disputes between the state and 
the nonstate actors.
Salehyan also argues that states that are neighbored by weak states are more 
likely to have internal rebellions emerge because weak states typically lack 
control over all of their territory. TNRs are able to take advantage of a state’s 
weaknesses to establish sanctuaries where they can organize, train, and launch 
attacks on the home state. Salehyan’s quantitative analysis thus confirms earlier 
studies that claim that civil conflicts tend to be geographically clustered.1
Another statistically significant finding is that refugees who have fled to neigh-
boring states tend to help prolong civil conflict in their home state, especially if 
they are located near the home country’s border or if the host state fails, inten-
tionally or through incapacity, to police the refugee camps. This is because such 
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conditions offer a friendly environment for insurgents to establish sanctuaries 
from which they can sustain their rebellion. The refugee camp becomes an 
extraterritorial base and a strategic asset to the TNR, and often plays a primary 
role in determining the longevity of the insurgency. Salehyan points out that 
when the refugee-hosting state is friendly to the home state, a TNR will find it 
hard to operate from the hosting state and the rebellion is likely to end. At the 
least, it will not cause interstate conflict.
The author’s analysis also finds a strong relationship between the existence of 
ethnic groups whose territory is divided by an international border and the 
likelihood of internal rebellion. Because these ethnic groups have access to their 
neighbors across the border, a local insurgent group can easily find support and 
set up bases across the border from where it will operate. Unless the neighboring 
state is friendly to the home state, Salehyan postulates that ethnic groups located 
along borders are more likely to rebel and cause regional instability than those 
that live away from the frontier. 
The second part of the book (Chapter 4) presents two long case studies, one of 
which focuses on the Contra War in Nicaragua (c. 1979–1989) and the other on 
the Rwandan Civil War of 1994, which brought the Rwandan Patriotic Front to 
power. Salehyan uses these case studies to further support his theoretical 
arguments and illustrate the relationship dynamics between states and nonstate 
actors during armed conflicts. 
In the book’s last part (Chapter 5), Salehyan summarizes and evaluates the find-
ings of his empirical analyses. When rebels have the ability to mobilize outside 
the target state, he notes, armed conflict is more likely to erupt. Furthermore, 
rebels who can freely cross borders have a better chance of escaping state repres-
sion and therefore, of sustaining a stronger insurgency, because state boundaries 
inhibit government authorities from projecting their power across the borders. 
Salehyan also acknowledges other factors that play significant roles in the dy-
namics of the interaction between states and nonstate actors, such as bargaining. 
While such factors cannot be measured quantitatively, they play a significant role 
in the resolution of conflicts of all kinds. Nevertheless, he recommends that to 
effectively resolve both internal and cross-border armed conflicts, the interna-
tional community should focus on dealing with the problem of safe havens for 
TNRs. 
Salehyan suggests a number of interesting topics for further research. For 
instance: How does the support from members of their community who live 
abroad or from external well-wishers influence rebel groups’ mobilization against 
the target state? How do these groups of insurgents differ from the TNRs that 
gain strength from establishing extraterritorial sanctuaries? In instances where the 
hosting state exerts control over the activities of the TNR, how is the armed conflict 
likely to play out? Salehyan provides strong evidence that poorly policed refugee 
camps facilitate the operations of TNRs. What happens in a situation in which 
refugees are spread among the populace instead of being congregated in camps? 
The strength of Rebels without Borders lies in its first part, in which the author 
lays out his research and theories on how and why TNRs become entrenched. 
The methodical presentation of the material, its empirical testing, and the strong 
support the author gives each argument with illustrative case studies makes this 
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well written and well referenced, and I think it should prove useful to students 
and scholars who seek a deeper understanding of global irregular conflicts. 
Salehyan could have added value to Rebels without Borders, however, if he had 
explored some of the literature on why and when rebels make the strategic deci-
sion to go transnational. For instance, what theories of mobilization do insur-
gents and opposition elements use to embark on their actions against the state? 2 
By adding this dimension to his discussion, he could have brought on board a 
wider audience of sociology and political science students and also made the 
book more self-contained, especially for readers who have limited background 
knowledge in theories of social movements.
Furthermore, Salehyan’s finding that ethnic tribes living along borders are  
more likely to resort to rebellion than those that are located farther away from 
the borders needs to be taken with some caution. Another similar study by James 
Fearon and David Laitin shows that ethnicity, or any other form of demographic 
diversity, has no significant influence on the onset of most civil wars.3 Further 
studies on ethnicity may be warranted to clear up this grey area.
I have personally experienced a situation in which rebellion in one state esca-
lated into armed civil conflict in a neighboring state. Salehyan’s findings are 
therefore not totally new to me, at least in practice, but he must be credited for 
conducting empirical tests on this assertion and thus coming up with the TNR 
theory. It seems to me, however, that the relationship between Sudan and its 
southern neighbor, Uganda, would not only illustrate the TNR theory much 
better than the Nicaraguan war does, but also would point out the exceptions to 
the model. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was Sudan’s most promi-
nent insurgent group, while Uganda had (and still has) the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) as one of its many insurgent groups. The LRA found sanctuary in 
the Sudan for years, but the SPLA, although it had sympathizers in the Ugandan 
government, did not have sanctuaries in Uganda. This is an exception to the 
theory of TNRs, and an exploration of it would help deepen Sulehyan’s analysis.4
Despite these limitations, Rebels without Borders overall is a good book for 
students of conflict studies, such as military leaders, strategic decision makers, 
and dons of conflict studies and political science. Graduate students who wish to 
see an example of a well-written and methodically presented project report may 
also find this book useful. v
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The American-led campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq led to an 
outpouring of thought and debate on the subject of irregular warfare. The most 
recent American military counterinsurgency doctrine, Insurgencies and Counter-
ing Insurgencies (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33), definitively characterized such struggles 
as being asymmetric in nature, and insurgents as operating most often from a 
position of weakness.1 But, if these actors are so weak, why is fighting irregular 
conflicts so difficult? On the assumption that understanding what makes 
a relationship asymmetric in the first place would help us better appreciate 
the nature of irregular conflicts, Malcolm Gladwell’s David and Goliath: Un-
derdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants is about understanding various 
asymmetries in the world around us.
Gladwell begins with an ancient Biblical tale that epitomizes the concept of a 
lopsided battle between a strong side and a weak side. A mighty and undefeated 
warrior named Goliath, wielding his massive war club, faced a mere shepherd 
boy named David, who was armed only with a staff and a sling. The two were to 
meet in individual combat to decide the fate of their respective tribes. The result, 
of course, was the classic “surprise” victory by the young and apparently out-
matched shepherd, who struck down the towering Goliath with a single stone 
from his slingshot and cut off the giant’s head, thus securing freedom for his 
people. As Gladwell points out, perhaps we have misunderstood this legendary 
tale all along: it was not in fact an uneven contest between the weak David and 
the mighty Goliath, but single combat between two different types of warriors. 
David simply shot Goliath with the ancient equivalent of a .45-caliber pistol, 
while Goliath had no weapons to match him at that distance.2 It is perhaps the 
first known use of “smart power” to defeat brute force in Western culture.3
Gladwell explores two central ideas in his book. The first is that lopsided contests 
that sometimes end with underdog victories may not actually be as they seem. In 
other words, we all may be failing to identify the true capabilities of our op-
ponents, and are instead assessing them on attributes they might not themselves 
value. Second, we persistently regard only certain qualities as important (advan-
tages) while failing to appreciate that the most valuable qualities may be born 
from adversity (disadvantages).
Gladwell maintains the same style as in his four prior best-selling books, each of 
which sought to explain other social phenomena.4 David and Goliath continues 
this mission, presenting Gladwell’s alternative perspective on asymmetries in the 
world around us through a mélange of exciting storytelling, history, and a large 
helping of of social science theory. In a manner that quickly hooks the reader, 
Gladwell initiates each subject with a personal narrative that threads throughout 
the chapter. Yet, even as each story snags the reader’s interest, Gladwell cleverly 
interweaves some social science theory that serves as the explanatory weft of his 
argument.
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In “Part One: The Advantages of Disadvantages (and the Disadvantages of 
Advantages),” Gladwell asks whether we understand the true value of what we 
perceive to be advantages, and whether we can find anything positive in what 
we assume to be disadvantageous. More than a play on words, this first section 
presents three chapters that explore the famous maxim of Sun Tzu: “Know the 
enemy, and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” 5 In 
the course of this exploration, Gladwell wonders: Are we asking the correct 
questions? Do we understand our own capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and 
circumstances as well as those of our opponents? He answers these questions by 
examining the dynamics of some commonly accepted advantages, such as the 
notion that smaller is better when it comes to elementary school class size, and 
that conventional university rankings are a reliable measure of whether a student 
will receive a first-class undergraduate education.
In one of these stories, Gladwell describes a young woman’s struggle to succeed 
in a science and technology undergraduate program at an Ivy League univer-
sity. Her story illustrates a behavior known as “relative deprivation.” Gladwell 
describes how those who work in elite environments become victims of their 
own success and lose confidence in their abilities because they compare their 
progress only to their close peers, those who are operating within what is a highly 
selective microcosm. This sense of relative deprivation often leads to disillusion-
ment and failure versus appreciating one’s accomplishments and overall value on 
a more global scale. 
For studying population-centric conflicts, the concept of relative deprivation 
may be instrumental to understanding the grievances people have on both the 
micro and macro scales. Do people in areas with regular public services, such as 
garbage pickup and sewage, complain more when services are discontinued due 
to conflict or crisis than those who have never had those services? If the theory 
of relative deprivation applies to perceptions of prosperity and government 
services, then the answer is yes. When conducting assessments of a population’s 
attitudes in conflict, being able to disaggregate actual from perceived grievances 
could be vital to preserving or rebuilding civil society. In other words, the needs 
of the people should be analyzed relative to both their immediate communities 
and the society at large.
“Part Two: The Theory of Desirable Difficulty” discusses the coping and adapta-
tion mechanisms that evolve from disadvantages. Gladwell draws on a wide 
range of examples to illustrate that hardship and handicaps can breed resiliency 
and innovation, traits that allow people to achieve a degree of success that may 
not have been possible otherwise. He uses three examples—a child’s frustra-
tions growing up with dyslexia, a research oncologist’s work treating childhood 
leukemia, and the daily struggles of organizing the civil rights movement in the 
American South—to illustrate how people can grow through adversity. The 
parallels to dealing with irregular conflicts abound. Military adaptations and 
innovations are a direct result of the opponent’s actions. For example, insurgent 
forces often suffer setbacks that appear to be defeats, but experience has shown 
that these setbacks frequently mean that the insurgency is changing and adapting 
to work around the obstacles erected by their opponents.
In particular, what happens when awe-inspiring force (such as bombing) is used 








holds that the opponent will either give up in the face of overwhelming odds 
or just melt away. This logic has been found to be false. Studies such as Robert 
Pape’s Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War and Jason Lyall’s 
“Bombing to Lose? Airpower and the Dynamics of Violence in Counterinsur-
gency Wars” demonstrate that direct, overwhelming military coercion through 
aerial bombardment is ineffective in breaking the will of opponents, especially 
civilian populations.6 
Gladwell draws the same conclusion, but where these other theories of coercion 
focus on state-on-state behavior and the workings of state military apparatuses, 
Gladwell discusses how horrific experiences may create resiliency in individuals. 
He cites studies of World War II bombing campaigns, which concluded that 
people who saw bomb blasts but were too far away to be in direct danger 
tended to become resilient in the face of further bombing, compared to those 
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who experienced a near miss and were naturally more 
traumatized.
So why were Londoners so unfazed by the 
Blitz? Because forty thousand deaths and 
forty-six thousand injuries—spread across a 
metropolitan area of more than eight million 
people—means that there were more remote 
misses who were emboldened by the experi-
ence of being bombed than there were near 
misses who were traumatized by it.7
Thus, military coercion, if used incorrectly, might actually 
inoculate populations to be more resistant to violence.
Using this analysis to explore the conventional wisdom 
regarding bombing could change how we understand 
some of the unforeseen consequences of heavy-handed 
military coercion. If Gladwell’s analysis holds true for the 
modern use of precision guided munitions, then we would 
expect to see even more boldness 
in the face of military coercion. 
Each “smart bomb” produces a 
deadly and precise local effect, 
and thus, in turn, potentially 
hundreds of people will experi-
ence it as a remote miss. Under 
this logic, modern technology is 
essentially vaccinating opponents 
against trauma with each precision 
bomb dropped, and may actually 
embolden resistance.
In “Part Three: The Limits of Power,” Gladwell directly 
engages asymmetries that are at the heart of why people 
rebel against authority—the very basis of irregular con-
flicts. Using Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr.’s Rebellion 
and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts as 
a departure point, Gladwell asks the question: What are 
the limits to legitimate authority?
Leites and Wolf believed that all that counts 
are rules and rational principles. But what ac-
tually matters are the hundreds of small things 
that the powerful do—or don’t do—to estab-
lish their legitimacy, like sleeping in the bed of 
an innocent man you just shot accidently and 
scattering your belongings around his house.8
As he shows in case after case, the less force regimes use 
to administer their authoritarian power, the more readily 
will the population agree to be ruled. Gladwell cites 
California’s “three strikes” law and Britain’s heavy-handed 
tactics in Northern Ireland to demonstrate that when 
state officials use coercive authority to lessen civil violence, 
their tactics often have the opposite effect. Both of those 
measures actually increased violence and crime. Gladwell 
suggests instead that programs that carry visible, but less 
coercive, signs of state authority will be more successful 
in reducing violence and unrest. To illustrate, he points 
to an innovative tactic used by police in a poor New York 
City neighborhood: in addition to targeting criminals, 
the police conducted community outreach to encourage 
youngsters to stay in school. They also made a practice of 
handing out hugs and turkeys on Thanksgiving to families 
of at-risk young people, as a visible sign that the state’s 
authority was both legitimate and positive.
Can Gladwell’s approach in David and Goliath help us 
disentangle current events? Two ongoing examples of 
asymmetric war are useful tests. The recent conflict in 
Ukraine between the government and Russian-backed 
separatists is setting the stage for 
another misinterpretation of what 
is commonly valued as a strength. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO) has grown from 
16 member states to 28 members 
since the end of the Cold War. This 
expansion naturally raises the ques-
tion of whether NATO has grown 
too large to be effective. If one of 
its small new members is invaded 
or becomes politically unstable, 
will this alliance of 28 states mobilize itself to defend that 
state’s sovereignty, and perhaps risk a continent-wide war? 
Or, reflecting on Gladwell’s analysis, did the returns on 
being a NATO member start to diminish with the addition 
of 12 new members in Eastern Europe? In other words, 
might strength through increasing numbers be the wrong 
way to counter potential military or political threats in 
Europe?
The second example of asymmetric warfare is also at the 
forefront of today’s news: the meteoric rise of DAESH, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Ash-Sham (the so-called Islamic 
State, aka ISIL or ISIS).9 Beyond the near-daily reports of 
the medieval human rights atrocities its members commit, 
DAESH now appears to be a visibly functioning political 
entity—an actual state. The group’s own news outlets, 
via online sites, stories, and videos, boast of its newfound 
political development and institutional capacity. But the 
question remains, has DAESH developed too quickly? 







the emergence of state legitimacy?), or will this so-called “state” be short-lived 
because, if they are to actually administer a state, the agents of DAESH must leave 
the relative security that shadowy networks often provide?
Like any study, David and Goliath has its shortcomings. The personal stories 
Gladwell uses to illustrate his theoretical positions were selected because a general 
readership can easily connect to them, not because he uses them systematically 
to analyze a particular social phenomenon. In so doing, Gladwell successfully 
breathes life into what otherwise are niche interests in specific social science fields. 
Thus, a sharpened academic pen could poke holes in the examples, the findings, 
and the generalizable inferences that most readers will be tempted to draw from 
Gladwell’s analysis. The important point, however, is that David and Goliath will 
lead the reader to think differently about the concept of asymmetry and how the 
world identifies what are assumed to be advantages and disadvantages.  v
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Dr. Rich Yarger describes Building Partner Capacity (BPC) as an essential con-
cept for any practical US grand strategy. He discusses how SOF and others might 
think strategically about BPC in the 21st century environment and also what the 
implications of such thinking might be. Dr. Yarger notes that there are multiple 
ways of viewing the role of BPC and of SOF as part of a US grand or defense 
strategy. In order to best develop this grand concept, he urges decision makers, 
strategists, and planners to develop a high level of strategic understanding and 
the knowledge to distinguish between cooperation, partnering, and strategic 
partnerships among states and other international actors. While recognizing 
that the Joint Force and all the services and agencies play important roles in this 
larger picture of BPC, Dr. Yarger reasons that USSOCOM and SOF are presented 
with unique opportunities and challenges in pursuit of the grand strategy. 
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Each year, JSOU partners with the Special Operations and Low Intensity Con-
flict (SO/LIC) chapter of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in 
sponsoring the annual special operations essay contest. The first-place winner is 
recognized each year at the NDIA SO/LIC Symposium and awarded a $1,000 cash 
prize. The runner-up receives a $500 prize. The competition is open to resident 
and nonresident students attending Professional Military Education (PME) 
institutions and has produced outstanding works on special operations issues. 
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